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THE RHETORIC OF SYMMETRY 
Karen Petroski∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
References to the concept of symmetry have appeared in judicial 
opinions, advocacy efforts, and scholarly commentary throughout 
American legal history.  But for every legal writer who invokes the 
concept as a logical or moral ideal, there is another who dismisses it as a 
formalistic distraction or an arid illusion.  What is more, although legal 
writers virtually always use the term “symmetry” as if its meaning were 
self-evident, in fact they have used the same term to refer to a variety of 
distinct concepts, each with its own ambiguities.   
These inconsistencies, and the deeper patterns beneath them, should 
be of interest to all legal professionals, not only to scholars.  Normative 
references to symmetry are more than trivial examples of the rhetorical 
practices that give our legal discourse its characteristic texture.  Like all 
of these rhetorical practices, references to symmetry both structure and 
constrain legal reasoning in significant ways.1  In fact, legal rhetoric and 
legal reasoning—the themes and structures of persuasion typical of legal 
writing—are simply two sides of the same coin, interdependent and 
mutually supporting aspects of any functional, effective legal 
communication.2  Partly as a result of this relationship between legal 
rhetoric and reasoning, the examination of our rhetorical practices can 
indicate the limits of our thinking.3  Sustained analysis of even a 
seemingly insignificant rhetorical device may serve this end, as this 
Article seeks to demonstrate.  The historical analysis presented here 
suggests that despite the inconsistencies noted above, references to 
symmetry have played a consistent role in legal writing.  But, in part 
                                                          
∗  J.D., University of California, Berkeley, 2004; Ph.D., Columbia University, 1999. 
1 See NEIL MACCORMICK, RHETORIC AND THE RULE OF LAW 31, 54, 254 (2005); J.M. 
Balkin, A Night in the Topics: The Reason of Legal Rhetoric and the Rhetoric of Legal Reason, in 
LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 211-24 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz 
eds., 1996).  But see discussion infra note 215. 
2 See, e.g., JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES’ BOW: ESSAYS IN THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF 
THE LAW 17 (1985) (noting that in classical rhetoric, persuasion involved stating grounds 
for a conclusion); see also ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 
165-93 (2000); MACCORMICK, supra note 1; Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rhetoric of Constitutional 
Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2008, 2008 (2002); Robert A. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary 
Genre, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 201, 216, 219 (1990); Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results 
and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371 (1995); Gerald Wetlaufer, 
Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 VA. L. REV. 1545 passim (1990). 
3 See Berkey v. Third Ave. R.R. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.) 
(“Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, 
they end often by enslaving it.”). 
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because the nature of this role has never been expressly acknowledged, 
references to symmetry in legal writing may also function to reinforce 
broader patterns in legal rhetoric and thinking about law.  These remain 
powerful as long as they remain unexamined.  Closer attention to the 
role the concept has played can help us see ways to counteract the 
threats these patterns might pose to the effectiveness of our 
communication in and about legal institutions. 
Recent criticism of a parallel theme in contemporary political and 
military-strategic rhetoric illustrates the potential ramifications of 
uncritical allusions to “symmetry.”  Since the late 1990s,4 United States 
military strategists have increasingly applied the label “asymmetric” to a 
growing range of nonconventional military challenges.5  Many such 
references to “asymmetric threats” or “asymmetric warfare” have little in 
common other than application of the adjective to scenarios involving 
antagonists of the United States.6  Commentators critical of this rhetoric 
have pointed out that asymmetry is always a matter of perspective, that 
it is nothing new in warfare, and that the United States itself poses a kind 
of “asymmetric threat” to other global actors.7  These critics contend that 
labeling new scenarios “asymmetric” is a way of avoiding analysis by 
identifying a relationship as self-evidently unfair.8  More importantly, 
these uses of the label distance United States military strategy from 
responsibility for security shortfalls by attributing those shortfalls to the 
inherent unfairness of opponents’ tactics, rather than to any failure by 
                                                          
4 Kenneth E. McKenzie, Jr., What Is Asymmetric Warfare?, in THE REVENGE OF THE 
MELIANS: ASYMMETRIC THREATS AND THE NEXT QDR 1 (2000), available at 
http://www.hdu.edu/inss/McNair/mcnair62/m62cvr.html (dating the first appearance 
of the term to a 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review report); see also Robert David Steele, The 
Asymmetric Threat: Listening to the Debate, JOINT FORCES Q., Aut.-Wint. 1998-99, at 78-84, 
available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfg_pubs/1520.pdf. 
5 See, e.g., STEPHEN J. BLANK, RETHINKING ASYMMETRIC THREATS 7 (Sept. 2003), available 
at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/asymetry2.pdf; STEVEN LAMBAKIS ET AL., 
UNDERSTANDING “ASYMMETRIC” THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES 59-62 (Sept. 2002), 
available at http://www.nipp.org/Adobe/Asymmetry%20%20final%2002.pdf; Timothy J. 
Thomas, Deciphering Asymmetry’s Word Game, MIL. REV. 32, July-Aug. 2001, at 1-2, available 
at http://www.leavenworth.army.mil/milrev/English/JulAug01/thomas.htm.  By the 
mid-2000s the term had entered popular discourse.  See, e.g., David Carr, I’m in Love.  Why 
Shouldn’t I Be Paid?, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2005, at C1 (describing race for celebrity photos 
among paparazzi and tabloid newspapers as “asymmetric warfare”). 
6 See BLANK, supra note 5, at 3-6; Thomas, supra note 5, at 1-2. 
7 See, e.g., BLANK, supra note 5, passim; McKenzie, supra note 4, at 4-13; Thomas, supra 
note 5, at 2, 6. 
8 See generally BLANK, supra note 5, passim; Thomas, supra note 5, at 3-4; see also, BLANK, 
supra note 5, at 16 (“[A]symmetric threats or techniques are a version of not ‘fighting 
fair[ ]’. . . .” (quoting INST. FOR NAT’L SEC. STUD., NAT’L DEF. UNIV., STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT 
1998, at 169)). 
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the United States to investigate the strategic goals of various nonstate 
actors.9  In effect, the critics describe references to “asymmetric threats” 
as themselves subtle threats to national security. 
These critics have anticipated many of the observations that emerge 
from this Article.  They note the extent to which perceptions and 
assertions of symmetry depend on the speaker’s or writer’s frame of 
reference, the ways this dependency can result in the assignment of 
opposed normative values to the concept, the apparent readiness with 
which writers and speakers use it to avoid confronting or analyzing 
complex scenarios, and our tendency to overlook all of these 
implications.  This Article shows how these dynamics are also present in 
legal use of the concept and the term, and how careless references to 
“symmetry” in that context may also pose a threat of sorts.  However, 
this Article also draws from the story of legal reliance on the concept-
positive lessons for more careful approaches to the problems that we 
have used the term and concept of “symmetry” to avoid rather than to 
resolve.  
Part II of this Article introduces the term and the concept.  It first 
discusses current usage of the term “symmetry” outside the legal context 
and the three senses in which the term has been used in legal 
discourse—to refer to holistic aesthetic harmony, to relationships of 
precise correspondence, and to relationships of bilateral reflection.  Part 
II then explores the power and implications of these senses of the term 
by discussing the relations between these abstract conceptions and our 
perceptions and everyday life experiences.  By emphasizing the links 
between concrete experience and the abstractions to which the term 
refers, this discussion shows how the significance of the concept of 
symmetry is neither self-evident nor trivially simple.  Part III then 
presents a brief survey of the ways legal scholars to date have 
nevertheless tended to assume that the meaning of the concept is self-
evident.  Their possibly increasing reliance on the concept further 
clarifies the need for a better understanding of its function in legal 
rhetoric.  
Part IV surveys the ways in which the concept has been used in legal 
rhetoric, primarily judicial opinions, throughout United States legal 
history.  It identifies five areas of judicial functioning to which this 
rhetoric has linked the concept of symmetry:  rendering justice or 
                                                          
9 See BLANK, supra note 5, at 32 (“[W]hat makes this ‘asymmetric strategy’ a compelling 
threat is that it surpasses our capabilities of cognition . . . .”); see also id. passim. 
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achieving fairness, remaining faithful to the purposes of other 
lawmakers, making coherent law, correcting for market imperfections, 
and providing reasoned support for conclusions.  In each area, legal 
writers have consistently appealed to symmetry as a norm, but they have 
also questioned the validity of that norm.  Regardless of whether 
symmetry is viewed positively or critically, however, most references to 
the concept serve a similar rhetorical function:  underscoring the relative 
powerlessness or passivity of the writing court.  Writers of judicial 
opinions consistently use the term to describe the work courts do and to 
deny the labor and contingency that go into that work, or to assign this 
labor and risk to other institutions. 
Part V begins by reviewing the patterns described in Part IV in 
historical perspective to clarify the larger patterns in the use of the term.  
Specifically, Part V explains how the story told in Part IV is one of 
increasing conceptual pluralism and of increasing reliance on each of the 
conceptions of symmetry to articulate a posture of judicial passivity.  
Part V then briefly reviews the problems inherent in current uses of the 
term, summarizes the lessons that emerge from this review, and offers 
some preliminary suggestions for more self-aware use of the concept of 
symmetry in legal thought and writing. 
II.  SENSES OF SYMMETRY 
A. Current Usage 
According to standard modern dictionaries, English speakers 
currently use the term “symmetry” in four related ways.  The 
relationships among these senses of the term are, at least superficially, 
relatively straightforward:  (1) “symmetry” refers to the quality of 
having “balanced proportions,” or “beauty of form deriving from 
balanced proportions”; (2) it also refers to “the property of being 
symmetrical; [especially] correspondence in size, shape, and relative 
position of parts on both sides of a dividing line”; (3) in a more technical 
geometric sense, it refers to the property of “a rigid motion of a 
geometric figure that determines a one-to-one mapping onto itself”; and 
(4) finally, in a sense used primarily in physics, it refers to “the property 
of remaining invariant under certain changes (as of orientation in 
space . . . or of the direction of time flow).”10  The following discussion 
outlines the history of and some of the relationships among these senses 
of the term. 
                                                          
10 MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1266 (11th ed. 2004) [hereinafter 
MERRIAM WEBSTER’S]. 
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1. Holistic Symmetry 
The first dictionary sense of “symmetry”—”beauty of form deriving 
from balanced proportions”—is close to the original Hellenistic Greek 
meaning of the term.11  For many centuries afterward this was its 
primary meaning.  It is also the earliest sense in which the term appears 
in legal usage in the United States.12  At least after its initial appearance, 
this sense has largely lacked the connotations of correspondence tied to 
the other three senses in current use. 13  That is, instead of naming a 
relationship among different entities, this sense of the term names a 
unified relationship between parts and whole or a human response 
arising from perception of such a relationship.  Still, this sense of 
symmetry overlaps with the other senses discussed below.  Most 
obviously, instances of geometric symmetry, discussed next, appear to 
most people to involve pleasingly “balanced proportions,”14 as discussed 
in Part II.B.2 below. 
2. Symmetry as Correspondence and Reflection 
The second and third senses of the term noted above are particularly 
closely related, as the second is a special case of the third.  Because the 
third sense—referring to “the rigid motion of a geometric figure”—is the 
broader sense, understanding it helps to clarify the second sense, that of 
                                                          
11 See HERMANN WEYL, SYMMETRY 5-25 (1952); Salomon Bochner, Symmetry and 
Asymmetry, in 4 DICTIONARY OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 346 (1973-74), available at 
http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/DicHist/dict.html.  The OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 456 
(J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner, eds., 2d ed. 1989), lists usages corresponding to the first 
sense from the sixteenth century, but usages corresponding to the second, third, and fourth 
senses only from the nineteenth century on.  Id. 
12 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Coxe, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 170, 203 (1800) (Yeates, J.).  “The 
construction I have adopted, appears to me to restore perfect symmetry to the whole act, 
and to preserve its due proportions.”  Id. 
13 See Katherine Brading & Elena Castellani, Symmetry and Symmetry Breaking, in THE 
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2004), available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2004/entries/symmetry-breaking.  Brading and 
Castellani note that the term’s roots imply a correspondence of parts: “The term 
‘symmetry’ derives from the Greek words sun (meaning ‘with’ or ‘together’) and metron 
(‘measure’), yielding summetria, and originally indicated a relation of 
commensurability . . . .  It quickly acquired a further . . . meaning . . . of a proportion . . . 
harmonizing the different elements into a unitary whole.”  Id. 
14 See DOROTHY K. WASHBURN & DONALD W. CROWE, SYMMETRIES OF CULTURE: THEORY 
AND PRACTICE OF PLANE PATTERN ANALYSIS passim (1988).  On the other hand, balanced 
proportions do not always involve precise correspondence of parts.  See, e.g., GORDON S. 
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 602-06 (1969) (discussing 
shifts in understanding of the balance involved in models of mixed government from the 
balancing of complementary components to the balancing of multiple identical 
components). 
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correspondence on both sides of a dividing line, which may now be the 
most widespread sense in general usage.15   
Geometers identify four types of “rigid motion” giving rise to 
symmetrical relationships between figures on a two-dimensional plane.16  
Moving a figure in accordance with one of the motions to a new location 
on a plane produces another figure, which has a relationship of 
symmetry, or perfect structural correspondence, with the first.  The four 
symmetry-producing rigid motions are:  (1) reflection across an axis, 
resulting in reflective or bilateral symmetry, the second dictionary sense 
of the term (found, roughly, in the human face); (2) translation along a 
line, or translational symmetry (present in the holes on a belt); (3) 
rotation about a point, resulting in rotational symmetry (seen in the arms 
of a starfish); and (4) translation accompanied by reflection across a line 
parallel to the line of translation, or glide reflectional symmetry 
(exemplified by a set of footprints).17 
English speakers’ use of the term “symmetry” to refer to spatial 
correspondence of this variety seems to have solidified during the 
nineteenth century.18  A more general use of the term to refer to 
relationships—physically concrete or not—of precise correspondence 
also probably first emerged in the nineteenth century, both in and 
outside of legal writing.19  Legal rhetoric still uses the term in this way, 
but it has been joined and, in a number of contexts, eclipsed by the 
second sense—that of reflective symmetry.   
This more specific second sense of the term became widely popular 
later than the use of the term to refer to relationships of precise 
correspondence.20  Adoption of this sense in legal writing was even more 
belated.  Although references to bilateral symmetry appear sporadically 
in early twentieth-century legal discourse,21 this did not become a 
common way of articulating abstract relationships in legal writing until 
                                                          
15 See WASHBURN & CROWE, supra note 14, passim (noting the ascendancy of this sense). 
16 Id. at 44; Bochner, supra note 11, at 351. 
17 WASHBURN & CROWE, supra note 14, at 44-50. 
18 BOCHNER, supra note 11, at 347, 351. 
19 See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 11, at 456.  The Oxford English Dictionary 
dates at 1823 the first usage of the term to mean “[e]xact correspondence in position of the 
several points or parts of a figure or body.”  Id. 
20 See WASHBURN & CROWE, supra note 14, passim. 
21 See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937). 
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the late twentieth century.22  Now, however, it seems to be becoming the 
most prevalent sense in which the term is used in legal rhetoric.23   
Because of this prevalence, a further word on the relation between 
the bilateral sense of symmetry and the other types of geometric 
symmetry is in order.  In at least one significant way, reflective 
symmetry is unique among the geometric symmetries:  it is the only 
inherently binary form of symmetry.  Other types of symmetry may exist 
among indeterminate or even infinite numbers of repeated figures, but in 
two dimensions, a relationship of reflective symmetry by definition 
exists between two figures.  Metaphoric references to this conception of 
symmetry to explain issues thus limit, from the beginning, the amount of 
information that will be addressed in each instance.24  
3. Symmetry as Invariance 
The relationship between the geometrical senses of “symmetry” and 
the fourth dictionary definition—the “property of remaining invariant 
under certain changes”25 attributed to physical phenomena—should now 
be clear.  This notion of invariance in one respect, despite transformation 
in others, is simply an abstract extension of the concept of rigid motion, a 
metaphorical elaboration of the geometric meaning of “symmetry.”26   
                                                          
22 See infra Part V.A. 
23 See infra Parts II, III.A.3-III.A.5, III.D, IV.A; see also infra notes 45-53. 
24 See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez 531 U.S. 533, 549 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  In 
his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia used the bilateral conception of symmetry to support 
his argument that the restriction on legal services funding at issue was not viewpoint 
discriminatory.  Id.  Justice Scalia pointed out that the funding ban “is symmetrical: 
Litigants challenging the covered statutes . . . do not receive . . . funding, and neither do 
litigants defending those laws against challenge.”  Id. at 551.  Justice Scalia’s designation of 
all affected parties as “litigants” interchangeable but for their litigation positions permitted 
his point but also limited the accuracy of his description.  Id. 
In other ways, reflective symmetry is clearly analogous to other geometrical symmetries.  
In all cases, the parts of geometrically symmetrical figures correspond precisely to the parts 
of the figures with which they are symmetrical.  Thus, although bilateral symmetry is in 
one sense categorically different from the other forms of geometrical symmetry, it is also 
just like these other forms in that it involves a relationship of precise structural 
correspondence.  But see DONALD D. HOFFMAN, VISUAL INTELLIGENCE: HOW WE CREATE 
WHAT WE SEE 96 (1998) (“Repetition, after all, is just translation, whereas [reflective] 
symmetry is translation and reflection.”). 
25 MERRIAM WEBSTER’S, supra note 10, at 1266. 
26 See BAS C. VAN FRAASSEN, LAWS AND SYMMETRY 243 (1990).  Philosopher of science Bas 
Van Fraassen explains this sense in this way: “Symmetries are transformations . . . that 
leave all relevant structure intact—the result is always exactly like the original, in all 
relevant respects.”  Id. 
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This sense, too, appears to have first gained wide usage in the 
nineteenth century.27  Legal rhetoric rarely uses the term in this sense.  
Still, the metaphorical extension that gave rise to this meaning of the 
term hints at the incredible conceptual adaptability of the geometric 
sense of the term, a phenomenon illustrated at length in Parts II.B.2 and 
II.B.3 below.  
B. Giving Content to Symmetry 
1. Is Symmetry an Empty Concept? 
In a well-known critique of the concept of equality, Peter Westen 
characterizes the concept as an “empty idea.”28  Symmetry is, like 
equality, a relational concept with precise mathematical meanings and 
protean legal meanings.29  Does Westen’s critique apply to the concept of 
symmetry as well?30   
Westen’s main point is that the concept of equality is so purely 
abstract and relational that it cannot, in itself, possibly have any concrete 
content—thus, it is “empty.”  Although Westen never couches his point 
in precisely these terms, his work describes legal reliance on the concept 
of equality as a conceptual and rhetorical shortcut whose use both 
permits and masks avoidance of the analysis of relevant normative 
issues.31  This analysis is similar to that of the critics of the “asymmetric 
                                                          
27 See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 11, at 457.  The Oxford English Dictionary 
lists 1819 as the date of the first usage of the word “symmetrical” “[a]pplied to an 
expression, function, or equation whose value is never altered by interchanging the values 
of any two variables or unknown quantities.”  Id.; see also Bochner, supra note 11, at 352-53. 
28 See PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE RHETORICAL FORCE OF 
“EQUALITY” IN MORAL AND POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1990) [hereinafter WESTEN, SPEAKING OF 
EQUALITY]; Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982) 
[hereinafter Westen, Empty Idea]. 
29 See WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY, supra note 28, at 262-80.  Isaiah Berlin, cited by 
Westen in this connection, even equated the concepts in discussing the meaning of 
“equality.”  See Isaiah Berlin, Equality as an Ideal, in JUSTICE AND SOCIAL POLICY 128, 131 (F. 
Olafson ed., 1961).  “The assumption is that equality needs no reasons, only inequality does 
so; that uniformity, regularity, similarity, symmetry . . . need not be specially accounted for, 
whereas differences, unsystematic behaviour, change in conduct, need explanation . . . .”  
Id. 
30 See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 2, at 121 (noting that a danger of analysis in terms of 
binaries or contraries is an excessive focus on the relation between the contraries, at the 
expense of attention to the substance of the contrary elements). 
31 See Westen, Empty Idea, supra note 28, at 547.  In Westen’s view, the concept of equality 
always borrows its substance from the rules whose application is at issue.  Id.  In his book, 
Westen addresses how the term allows its users to avoid performing or articulating certain 
communicative and cognitive tasks, primarily the precise disambiguation of allied ideas.  
Id.; see also WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY, supra note 28, at 262-80. 
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threat” concept.  But Westen’s insistence on addressing his subject in 
exclusively abstract terms, although it is consistent with a certain 
philosophical tradition, seems to foreordain his conclusion regarding the 
nature of the concept of equality.32  Ultimately, his critique approaches 
tautology.   
In an attempt to avoid this pitfall, this Article next looks at one 
approach to understanding how our experience gives content to abstract 
concepts, including the conceptions of symmetry presented above. 
2. From Perception to Concept  
Over the past few decades, legal scholars have fruitfully drawn on 
research in cognitive science for insight into such central legal concerns 
as the nature of intentional action and decision-making.  Much of the 
most influential work in this vein has focused on the intentions and 
unconscious biases of those subject to the law33 or making the law.34  
With a few exceptions, however, this type of scholarship has not applied 
the insights of cognitive and behavioral science to explore the 
implications of the conscious and unconscious decision-making involved 
specifically in persuasive communication, or rhetoric,35 even though 
some recent interdisciplinary work in cognitive science has focused 
heavily on the relationships linking perception, experience, language 
use, and reasoning.36  This work suggests that understanding our 
                                                          
32 See WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY, supra note 28, at 285.  This limitation is 
reproduced by most of Westen’s critics.  Id.  Westen himself acknowledges it, albeit not as a 
problem.  Id. 
33 See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias 
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995); 
Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998). 
34 See, e.g., Ronald Chen & Jon Hansen, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge 
Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103 (2004); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A 
Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1988); Cass R. 
Sunstein et al., Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1153 (2002). 
35 But see STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND (2001). 
36 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson are prominent popularizers of this particular 
approach.  See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1987); GEORGE 
LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND AND ITS 
CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT (1999) [hereinafter LAKOFF & JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN 
THE FLESH].  For other introductions to a similar approach to interdisciplinary cognitive 
science, see MARK TURNER, COGNITIVE DIMENSIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE passim (2001); 
FRANCISCO J. VARELA ET AL., THE EMBODIED MIND: COGNITIVE SCIENCE AND HUMAN 
EXPERIENCE 7-9 (1993); ROBERT A. WILSON, BOUNDARIES OF THE MIND: THE INDIVIDUAL IN 
THE FRAGILE SCIENCES: COGNITION 144-213 (2004); and Mark Anderson, How to Study the 
Mind: An Introduction to Embodied Cognition, in EMBODIED COGNITION AND PERCEPTUAL 
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perceptions and experiences of symmetry may be crucial to 
understanding the full implications of more metaphorical and abstract 
uses of the term.  The following discussion explains this approach 
briefly, then reviews what some researchers have learned about human 
perception of symmetry in the various senses described above, before 
turning to the question of how these perceptions might shape and 
inform legal uses of the term. 
The reasons for the appearance of abstract concepts, like that of 
symmetry, in the cognitive systems of developing children are not well 
understood, but the capacity appears to be a human universal.37  Based 
on this fact and on experimental results, some researchers and theorists 
in cognitive science have suggested that the capacity for abstraction, 
including the use of language referring to abstractions, does not depend 
on different brain functions from those we use in exercising our 
capacities for perception and physical action.  In this approach, the 
building blocks of purposive action, abstract thought, and language alike 
are “stable recurring patterns of sensorimotor experience,”38 or 
consistent patterns of neural activity known as schemas,39 which provide 
the raw material and concrete basis for our conceptual systems, 
including our use of language and our reasoning.40  For example, our 
                                                                                                                                  
LEARNING IN ADAPTIVE DEVELOPMENT (F. Santoianni & C. Sabatano eds., 2005), available at 
http://cogprints.org/3945/. 
37 See MORTON HUNT, THE STORY OF PSYCHOLOGY 528-29 (1993). 
38 Mark Johnson & Tim Rohrer, We Are Live Creatures: Embodiment, American Pragmatism, 
and the Cognitive Organism, in 1 BODY, LANGUAGE AND MIND 11, 12 (Jordan Zlatov et al. 
eds., 2005). 
39 See MARK JOHNSON, THE BODY IN THE MIND: THE BODILY BASIS OF IMAGINATION, 
REASON, AND MEANING (1987). 
40 When a person experiences a visual sensation, the stimulus activates a networked 
system of connections within the person’s brain.  See, e.g., HOFFMAN, supra note 24, at 67-71, 
177-82; JOHN HOLLAND, EMERGENCE: FROM CHAOS TO ORDER 101-14 (1998); VARELA ET AL., 
supra note 36, at 93-98.  Some connections take the form of “topological neural maps,” 
patterned in ways corresponding to (but not reproducing or representing) the structure of 
the perceived object.  Johnson & Rohrer, supra note 38, at 12.  Such maps are also activated 
by motor activity, as well as by reading, imagining, and reasoning—and the neural maps 
activated by mental activities that we typically understand to be distinct from physical 
experience in fact overlap significantly with those activated by physical perception or 
manipulation.  Id. at 8-13; Tim Rohrer, Image Schemata in the Brain, in FROM PERCEPTION TO 
MEANING: IMAGE SCHEMAS IN COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS 7-23 (Beate Hempe & Joe Grady eds., 
2005).  Thus, experiments have shown that “abstract reasoning about economics can be 
done by the same structured neural network that has the capacity to control high-level 
motor schemas.”  LAKOFF & JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH, supra note 36, at 583 
(citing S. Narayanan, Embodiment in Language Understanding: Sensory-Motor 
Representations for Metaphoric Reasoning About Event Descriptions (1997) (unpublished 
Ph.D. diss., Univ. of Cal., Berkeley).  In other words, perception, action, and abstract 
conceptualization may not involve fundamentally different types of brain processes.  Id.  
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physical experience with containers and their contents generates a stable 
schema that we use to interact with and draw inferences about not just 
actual containers of all kinds, but also our selves, our minds, and our 
creations.41  On this view, when we identify particular abstract 
relationships as “symmetrical,” and then draw inferences based on those 
references, we are using schemas drawn from our perceptions of and 
experience with concrete relationships or phenomena that we would also 
identify as symmetrical, such as the human body and many architectural 
structures. 
What has research shown about how we actually experience those 
concrete relationships and phenomena?  One theorist of perception, 
Michael Leyton, has gone so far as to hypothesize that the mental 
reconstruction of symmetry, a condition he equates with 
“indistinguishability,” is the basis of all perception.42  His view is fairly 
radical and not particularly widespread,43 although some of Leyton’s 
conclusions are shared more widely.  For instance, many vision theorists 
hold that people tend to “interpret image motions as projections of rigid 
motions in three dimensions”—that is, they experience perceived motion 
as if it were occurring through the generation of geometric symmetries.44  
This is one explanation of the process that allows us to feel that we see 
continuous motion when presented with a sequence of static images, as 
in a flipbook or a film, and it is fully consistent with Leyton’s theory.  On 
the other hand, in a conclusion that appears to contradict Leyton’s 
theory, the physiological psychologist Bela Julesz proposed that “the 
visual system encodes reflection symmetry but not direct repetition[,]” 
                                                                                                                                  
Further, one approach to the nature of reasoning holds that we draw inferences based on 
the “entailments” of our cognitive schemas—features, properties, and functional aspects of 
the underlying concrete schemas.  Id.  Among the entailments of the container schema, for 
instance, are the facts that we can put things into and take things out of containers and that 
it may be easier to perceive a container than it is to perceive its contents.  Id.  We use these 
features to reach conclusions not only about containers but also about things, including 
other abstract concepts, that we liken to them.  Id.; see also LAKOFF & JOHNSON, METAPHORS 
WE LIVE BY, supra note 36, at 9, 17-19; LAKOFF & JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH, supra 
note 36, passim; Jacqueline P. Leighton, Defining and Describing Reason, in THE NATURE OF 
REASONING 13 (Jacqueline P. Leighton & Robert J. Sternberg eds., 2004). 
41 See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY, supra note 36, at 29-32; LAKOFF & 
JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH, supra note 36, at 341, 379-90. 
42 See MICHAEL LEYTON, SYMMETRY, CAUSALITY, MIND (1992). 
43 Leyton approaches vision and cognition as modular, simplifying processes.  Compare 
id., with WILSON, supra note 36, 172-80, 232-41 (discussing theorists who take a different 
approach to the conceptualization of vision). 
44 HOFFMAN, supra note 24, at 159. 
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or translation symmetry.45  Julesz based this conclusion on experiments 
in which he showed subjects two types of images.  Both types involved 
the repetition of small arrays of randomly spaced dots.  In one set of 
images, the arrays were repeated through translation, as in a wallpaper 
pattern.  In the other set, the arrays were repeated through reflection.  
Subjects recognized the reflected arrays as instances of repetition more 
readily and consistently than they recognized the translated arrays as 
instances of repetition.  Julesz’s experiments seemed to show that people 
might be in some sense hard-wired to perceive reflective symmetry, and 
also that they prefer reflective symmetry to simple correspondence.  
In line with this preference, most other experimental studies 
investigating the perception of symmetry have focused on reflective 
symmetry alone, and not in comparison with translational symmetry.46  
It is possible that researchers are predisposed to identify bilateral 
symmetry as an interesting topic for research by their own tendency to 
perceive it more readily.47  Much of the experimental data may therefore 
beg the question of the reason for the predisposition.  But even with 
these limitations, recent studies have provided interesting information 
regarding our perception of—and strong preference for—bilateral 
symmetry.  People prefer bilaterally symmetrical figures to asymmetrical 
ones.48  Generally, people are also able to reproduce bilaterally 
symmetrical figures more accurately than asymmetrical ones.49  The 
preference for bilateral symmetry is so strong, in fact, that people will 
unconsciously distort asymmetrical figures to see them as symmetrical.50  
                                                          
45 WASHBURN & CROWE, supra note 14, at 19.  This conclusion was based on experiments 
in which Julesz demonstrated that “the eye distinguishes between sections of dot arrays 
which are repeated from array sections which are reflected across a mirror plane.”  Id.; see 
also CHRIS MCMANUS, RIGHT HAND, LEFT HAND: THE ORIGINS OF ASYMMETRY IN BRAINS, 
BODIES, ATOMS AND CULTURES 350-52 (2002). 
46 See WASHBURN & CROWE, supra note 14, at 14, 19.  For a discussion of Ernst Mach, who 
likely conducted the first experimental studies of human perception of symmetry in the 
late nineteenth century, see HOFFMAN, supra note 24, at 95-97 (describing some of Mach’s 
experiments); MCMANUS, supra note 45, at 352 (same); and WASHBURN & CROWE, supra note 
14, at 19-24 (providing synopsis of research on perception of symmetry). 
47 See HOFFMAN, supra note 24, at 95-97 (discussing the flaws of Mach’s experiments). 
48 WASHBURN & CROWE, supra note 14, at 21.  This preference may not constrain 
conceptions of human attractiveness as much as was popularized in recent decades.  
Compare Geoffrey Cowley & Karen Springer, The Biology of Beauty, NEWSWEEK, June 3, 1996, 
at 60 (setting forth popular notion that facial symmetry is directly correlated with 
perceived  attractiveness), with Dahlia Zaidel & Jennifer Cohen, The Face, Beauty, and 
Symmetry: Perceiving Asymmetry in Beautiful Faces, 115 INT’L J. NEUROSCIENCE 1165 (2005), 
available at http://cogprints.org/4601/ (finding that subjects detected asymmetry in 
beauty, and suggesting that faces considered beautiful can be functionally asymmetrical). 
49 WASHBURN & CROWE, supra note 14, at 21, 23. 
50 Id. at 21. 
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And vertical bilateral symmetry—symmetry on both sides of a vertical 
axis—is the most perceptually salient form of symmetry.51  This salience 
may be a human universal,52 although developmental and cultural 
variations exist in the ease with which people perceive reflective 
symmetry around axes that are other than vertical.53   
This research indicates that the term “symmetry,” at least in the 
geometric and bilateral senses, refers to a type of perception that we 
respond to differently from other perceptions.  Perception research has 
also not included research into our perceptions of symmetry in the 
holistic sense, as such, but researchers have explored our aesthetic 
perceptions and preferences and our reactions to simplicity and 
complexity.  Much research has found strong preferences for cognitive 
efficiency,54 or simplicity and familiarity, and closure.55  But we are not 
driven only by a need to reduce cognitive complexity and resolve 
conflict.  Experiments on animals and humans have also shown a 
universal “cognitive need . . . for mental stimulation” in the form of a 
moderate level of variety and complexity.56  Subjects given a choice 
between a featureless environment and a stimulating one invariably 
choose the latter.57 
How do these experimental findings help us to understand the 
various notions of symmetry described above and, beyond that, the uses 
of the term in legal communication?  First, our drives toward cognitive 
efficiency and closure, combined with our preference for limited variety, 
suggest an explanation for the longevity of the holistic conception of 
symmetry.  Ultimately, when we use the term in this sense we seem to be 
                                                          
51 MCMANUS, supra note 45, at 350-52; WASHBURN & CROWE, supra note 14, at 21-22. 
52 WASHBURN & CROWE, supra note 14, at 24. 
53 Id. at 21-22; MICHAEL C. CORBALLIS, THE LOPSIDED APE: EVOLUTION OF THE 
GENERATIVE MIND 129 (1991). 
54 See HOFFMAN, supra note 24, at 27-46; Chen & Hanson, supra note 34, at 1128, 1140-68; 
Maxwell J. Roberts, Heuristics and Reasoning I: Making Deduction Simple, in THE NATURE OF 
REASONING 234 (Jacqueline P. Leighton & Robert J. Sternberg eds., 2004). 
55 Dan Simon has devoted several articles to explaining his experimental demonstration 
of coherence, a form of logical closure, as a cognitive constraint and applying these findings 
to legal decision-making.  See, e.g., Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision 
Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (1998) [hereinafter Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision 
Making]; Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision-
making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511 (2004); Dan Simon, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A 
Look Through the Lens of Cognitive Psychology, 67 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1097 (2002); see also 
Johnson & Rohrer, supra note 38, at 13. 
56 HUNT, supra note 37, at 493-94. 
57 Id. at 494 (citing ROBERT A. BARON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGY: UNDERSTANDING BEHAVIOR 
320 (1980)); ROSS BUCK, HUMAN MOTIVATION AND EMOTION 356 (1988)). 
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referring to our satisfaction at attaining a coherent perception or 
conceptualization.58  Because it refers to the result of a process, this 
conception does not imply any need for further action or analysis; it 
presupposes the prior satisfactory completion of a process without 
implying anything in particular about the nature of that process.  The 
“balanced proportions”59 involved may, in some cases, be akin to 
bilateral reflection, but could just as easily be other relationships we are 
disposed to perceive as pleasing, possibly because of the frequency with 
which we encounter them.60  When we achieve or need to assert that we 
have achieved comprehension of the solution to a problem, it is therefore 
natural to think of and describe the achievement in terms of a diffuse, 
pleasing holism.61  This holism is not a property of the problem itself, or 
a property of its parts or the process of its solution, but a feature we 
attribute to its solution. 
The observations described above also suggest ways to be more 
specific about the significance of the concept of bilateral symmetry.  As 
noted above, this type of symmetry is an especially salient visual pattern 
and conceptual schema.62  Its perceptual salience is paralleled by its 
prevalence in linguistic usage and experimental inquiry, as well as the 
growing predominance of reflective symmetry over translational 
symmetry in legal conceptualization.63  Schemas of reflective symmetry 
are particularly powerful because their binary simplicity efficiently 
satisfies both our drive toward moderate complexity and our drive 
toward closure—they embody both variety and completeness.64  In 
several regards, this schema also bears directly on our self-
conceptualization as active individuals and social beings.  For instance, it 
has been suggested that we associate vertical reflective symmetry not 
only with humanity, as the human body outwardly appears bilaterally 
symmetrical,65 but also with the capacity for effective directed action, as 
a creature lacking bilaterally symmetrical appendages cannot move in a 
                                                          
58 See Chen & Hanson, supra note 34; supra note 55. 
59 MERRIAM WEBSTER’S, supra note 10, at 1266. 
60 See infra Part V.B.2. 
61 See supra note 55; infra note 302. 
62 See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text; see also TURNER, supra note 36, at 41-42 
(identifying symmetry as among the strong regularities in the construction of meaning). 
63 See infra Parts III, IV.D. 
64 See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 2, at 115.  “[T]he most significant truth is a simultaneous 
statement of opposing truths.”  Id. 
65 See WEYL, supra note 11, at 3.  But see MCMANUS, supra note 45, at 95 (noting that the 
human body is actually characterized by “external symmetry coupled with a gross internal 
asymmetry of the viscera”). 
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straight line.66  A bilaterally reflective symmetrical schema can also 
structure our conceptualization of the most rudimentary form of social 
existence:  interaction between two individuals, at least when observed 
passively by a third party.67  But at the same time, reflective symmetry is 
linked to schemas of stasis; we perceive something like reflective 
symmetry when we perceive substances in absolute equilibrium, like 
items on a balancing scale.68  Bilateral symmetry schemas thus 
paradoxically and powerfully embody both action and its nullification.69  
These properties appeal simultaneously to our drives toward cognitive 
efficiency and closure70 and to our drive toward manageable 
complexity.71 
3. Symmetry in the Constructed World 
Cognitive scientists and those drawing on their work have studied 
not only the experiences of individuals, but also human interactions and 
other environmental factors as cognitive context.72  The notion of 
distributed or extended cognition73 refers to the ways in which 
“successful cognition often requires many functionally interacting agents 
and instruments, no one of whom conducts the thinking entirely or even 
mostly.”74  This approach notes the human tendency to “offload” 
cognition on to artifacts, such as written records and computers, and 
institutions, such as language and social organization, and it takes those 
factors to be integral parts of our cognitive apparatus.75  This approach 
also stresses the extent to which cognition is an interactive, not passive, 
                                                          
66 See generally CORBALLIS, supra note 53, at 81, 101, 206; MCMANUS, supra note 45, at 91-
94; WEYL, supra note 11, at 27. 
67 See PAUL SEABRIGHT, THE COMPANY OF STRANGERS:  A NATURAL HISTORY OF 
ECONOMIC LIFE 48-66 (2004). 
68 WEYL, supra note 11, at 25. 
69 Cf. Bochner, supra note 11, at 349-51 (discussing limitations of notion of bilateral 
symmetry). 
70 See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. 
71 See HUNT, supra note 37, at 493-94. 
72 See generally EDWIN HUTCHINS, COGNITION IN THE WILD (1995); LAKOFF & JOHNSON, 
PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH, supra note 36, at 107. 
73 See HUTCHINS, supra note 72; WILSON, supra note 36; cf. MARY DOUGLAS, HOW 
INSTITUTIONS THINK (1987). 
74 TURNER, supra note 36, at 46.  “[H]uman beings arrange their environments to serve, 
extend, and alter their thinking, or, metaphorically, rely on their environments to do some 
of their thinking for them.”  Id.  Robert Wilson terms this “exploitative representation” and 
presents the example of using a pen and paper to perform simple mathematical 
computations.  WILSON, supra note 36, at 162-80, 291. 
75 See, e.g., CORBALLIS, supra note 53, at 63-75; TERRENCE W. DEACON, THE SYMBOLIC 
SPECIES: THE CO-EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE AND THE BRAIN 402-05 (1997); WILSON, supra 
note 36, at 183-307. 
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process.76  The approach is relevant to understanding the various senses 
of symmetry in legal rhetoric in at least two ways.   
First, the fact that the experience of those involved in creating legal 
rhetoric involves a large number of human-made artifacts may shed 
some light on their, and our, metaphoric use of schemas of translational 
symmetry.  The discussion above noted that people may be less disposed 
to perceive translational symmetry than they are to perceive reflective 
symmetry.  Yet humans are also clearly drawn to translational 
symmetry; people across cultures have had a striking tendency to create 
artifacts including not only reflectional, but also translational and glide-
reflective symmetries as components of their design and, more recently, 
to create and value artifacts that are translationally symmetrical in the 
sense that they are, for all practical purposes, identical to one another.77  
Mass-produced artifacts exhibiting symmetries of both types now 
pervade the perceptible lived environments of many people more 
extensively than do any natural symmetries.78  This development affects 
perception and, as a consequence, thinking.   
For instance, a person who grows up in a city surrounded by 
structures with many geometrically symmetrical features will actually 
develop a slightly different perceptual apparatus from a person who 
does not develop while surrounded by similar stimuli.79  This different 
perceptual apparatus will make different cognitive schemas available to 
that person.  Increasingly, these symmetries seem to be a given.  Yet it is 
always evident that they are created, rather than natural.  They bespeak 
controlled, predictable, and thus comforting repetition, on the one hand, 
and endless proliferation, on the other.  They threaten to overwhelm us, 
                                                          
76 See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 36, at 221. 
77 Aesthetic and functional creations in many cultures recreate symmetries 
compulsively.  See WASHBURN & CROWE, supra note 14, at 7.  Conceptual creations also 
exhibit this tendency.  See LEYTON, supra note 42; see also J.M. Balkin, The Crystalline 
Structure of Legal Thought, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1986). 
78 See WASHBURN & CROWE, supra note 14, at 13; cf., e.g., CORBALLIS, supra note 53, at 308; 
LEYTON, supra note 42, at 586-98. 
79 See HUNT, supra note 37, at 454-55.  “Line detector” cells in the visual cortex become 
specialized through use and development to respond to vertical and horizontal lines.  Id.  
Kittens raised in an environment lacking vertical lines will develop a visual apparatus 
unable to perceive such lines.  “Similarly, people reared in cities have more exposure to 
vertical and horizontal lines during early childhood than to lines oriented otherwise, and 
develop a greater sensitivity to the former.”  Id. (citing R.B. Annis & B. Frost, Human Visual 
Ecology and Orientation Anistrophies in Acuity, 182 SCIENCE 729-31 (1973)); see also LEYTON, 
supra note 42, at 596 (“Mass production . . . creates an environment that is a hierarchy 
purely of symmetries, and this ensures that behavior is a hierarchy purely of 
symmetries.”). 
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yet imply a history of human control.80  As the discussion below shows, 
the ambivalence inherent in this conceptual schema, which is slightly 
different from the ambivalence inherent in references to bilateral 
symmetry, has also found its way into legal rhetoric. 
The second insight provided by the notion of distributed cognition is 
the perspective it suggests on the legal system itself, a perspective 
complemented by the role that the concept of symmetry has played in 
legal rhetoric, as discussed more fully below.  To date, legal scholarship 
that has drawn on cognitive science research focused mostly on the 
cognition of individuals, not on interpersonal or institutional cognition.81  
But this focus is not inherent in the nature of either subject.  Both courts 
and legal discourse are tools with which people solve complex problems 
that they cannot solve on their own, either because they individually lack 
sufficient cognitive resources82 or because diverse perceptions and 
interests make it impossible for each individual personally involved in 
the problems to accommodate all relevant perspectives on a state of 
affairs.83  In this way, legal systems can be understood as cognitive 
systems, even though they are transpersonal systems.84  Procedural 
devices, such as rules of evidence, juries, discovery rules, and other 
mechanisms for the generation of consensual facts, are paradigmatic 
examples of distributed cognition.  So is the form of the reasoned judicial 
                                                          
80 See, e.g., CORBALLIS, supra note 53, at 308 (“The proliferation of objects means that we 
need different and more economical ways to represent them in our minds.”); see also JEAN 
BAUDRILLARD, SIMULACRA AND SIMULATION (Sheila Farina Glaser, trans., 1994); WALTER 
BENJAMIN, THE WORK OF ART IN THE AGE OF MECHANICAL REPRODUCTION (1937); 
CORBALLIS, supra note 53, at 182-86, 195-97. 
81 See, e.g., WINTER, supra note 35; sources cited supra note 36.  This may be in part 
because of the difficulties in working out clear models of extended cognition.  See generally 
DOUGLAS, supra note 73; WILSON, supra note 36, at 265-307. 
82 See DOUGLAS, supra note 73, at 111-28. 
83 Many anthropologists of law take a similar view.  See, e.g., Sally Engle Merry, 
Disputing Without Culture, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2057, 2063 (1987); see also KARL LLEWELLYN, 
THE BRAMBLE BUSH 12 (1930) (describing law as “[w]hat . . . officials do about disputes”) 
(emphasis omitted).  Certain areas of law, such as the law of agency, contracts, and 
corporations, do acknowledge and institutionalize the necessarily social, extended nature 
of cognition. 
84 See DOUGLAS, supra note 73. 
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opinion.85  The cognitive work performed by judicial opinions is, indeed, 
a crucial part of the social and political work they perform.86  
Another aspect of the American legal system performing an 
important distributed cognitive function more commonly recognized as 
such is the legal academy.  But this function extends beyond the 
education of students.87  The work produced by legal scholars also 
performs self-evidently, and often self-consciously, collective problem-
solving functions.88  Yet, as Part III demonstrates, this function of legal 
scholarship does not always inform scholars’ methods.  Legal scholars’ 
use of the concept of symmetry provides an instructive case study of this 
phenomenon. 
III.  SYMMETRY IN RECENT LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
In the past two or three decades, legal scholars have increasingly 
relied on conceptual schemas of symmetry to organize their analyses and 
recommendations.89  But the concept has been subjected to surprisingly 
                                                          
85 For traditional justifications, see, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 
Term—Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 64-65, 76-77 (1961) [hereinafter 
Bickel, The Passive Virtues]; Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN L. REV. 633, 653-59 
(1995); and David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 737-38 
(1987). 
86 Opinions publicize the conceptual bases for the resolution of conflicts in a way 
allowing affected individuals to integrate that resolution into their own lives, see JOHN M. 
CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O’BARR, RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS: THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF 
LEGAL DISCOURSE (1990); DOUGLAS, supra note 73, and facilitating the resolution of other 
problems by other participants in the legal system, including other courts and legislatures.  
See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS 156, 162-63, 240 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter BICKEL, THE LEAST 
DANGEROUS BRANCH]; Bickel, The Passive Virtues, supra note 85, at 50-51, 56, 60-64. 
87 For example, the type of learning encouraged through Socratic dialogue is, contrary to 
received wisdom, not unique to legal education, but institutionalized throughout legal 
practice.  See Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court 1997 Term—Foreword: The Limits of Socratic 
Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 33-34 (1998); see also BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS 
BRANCH, supra note 86, at 156. 
88 See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 85, at 731. 
89 Work in the 1950s and early 1960s introduced the concepts of information and other 
asymmetries into economic and political analysis.  See, e.g., DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY OF 
COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS 58 (1958); Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & 
ECON. 1 (1960); George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961).  
Otherwise, the earliest example of legal scholarship relying on the concept of symmetry for 
organizational or normative purposes revealed in the research for this project dates from 
1965.  Charles D. Tarlton, Symmetry and Asymmetry as Elements of Federalism: A Theoretical 
Speculation, 27 J. POL. 861 (1965).  For other early examples, see David Gray Adler, The 
Framers and Treaty Termination: A Matter of Symmetry, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 891; William C. 
Gifford, Jr., United States Tax Effects of Foreign Losses: A Symmetry Analysis, 83 YALE L.J. 312 
(1973); and Luther M. Swygert, The Proposed National Court of Appeals: A Threat to Judicial 
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little analysis.  One scholar, Robert Laurence, has critically analyzed the 
sense of the term “symmetry” used in physics in connection with his 
examination of patterns in federal Indian law doctrine.90  Two others, 
Barbara Flagg and Katherine Goldwasser, have advanced a brief 
assessment of the function of symmetry as a norm in legal discourse.91  
But these approaches, discussed below, are not exhaustive analyses of 
the concept.  They are also anomalous; most commonly, legal scholars 
note the extent to which concepts of balance (reflective symmetry)92 and 
equality (translational symmetry)93 underpin legal thought, then stop 
analysis at the point of this identification, reducing the schemas to a 
priori principles.94   
A comprehensive study of the use of the schemas in legal 
scholarship would require a great deal of space.  This survey presents 
just a few illustrations of how the schemas work in legal scholarship in 
order to clarify why the present study is needed. 
A. Uses of Symmetry in Legal Scholarship 
1. Symmetry as an Organizing Device  
In recent decades, legal scholars have increasingly used the concept 
of symmetry, mainly in the bilateral sense, to organize presentation of 
their insights.  Matter organized in this way ranges from the domain of 
legal doctrine at its most abstract level, conceived as an ordered system 
built on conceptual opposition,95 through the relationships and tensions 
                                                                                                                                  
Symmetry, 51 IND. L.J. 327 (1976).  As other examples cited in this section suggest, the 
number of articles giving a prominent place to the concept has increased greatly since the 
1990s, as has the volume of legal scholarship generally. 
90 Robert Laurence, Symmetry and Asymmetry in Federal Indian Law, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 861 
(2000). 
91 Barbara Flagg & Katherine Goldwasser, Fighting for Truth, Justice, and the Asymmetrical 
Way, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 105 (1998). 
92 See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 159 (2d ed. 1994) (“[J]ustice is 
traditionally thought of as maintaining or restoring a balance or proportion.”); WINTER, supra 
note 35, at 16, 115 (“It is hard to imagine a system of moral reasoning that is not motivated 
by the BALANCE schema.”); see also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 36, 48-53 (1971) 
(describing device of “reflective equilibrium”). 
93 See, e.g., HART, supra note 92, at 159; RAWLS, supra note 92, at 54-60; John E. Coons, 
Consistency, 75 CAL. L. REV. 59, 99-103 (1987). 
94 See, e.g., Coons, supra note 93. 
95 See, e.g., Leo Katz, What We Do When We Do What We Do and Why We Do It, 37 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 753, 754 (2000) (citing Weyl, supra note 11, for the proposition that “the best 
way to explore any subject you are interested in . . . is to explore its symmetries and 
asymmetries”); cf. Balkin, supra note 77. 
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among various constitutional principles,96 to highly specific doctrinal 
questions.97   
In this work scholars usually adopt the reflective sense of symmetry, 
apparently for its familiarity, its simplicity, and its analytic 
implications.98  The normative implications of the conception in this type 
of scholarship consist mainly of the ways in which bilaterally 
symmetrical organization implies that analytic possibilities are 
exhausted once contraries are considered.  This vein of scholarship 
assumes that the utility of the concept is self-evident and makes no 
explicit claims about the normative value of any sense of symmetry.   
2.   Symmetry as a Norm   
Scholars have also used the concept of symmetry in more self-
consciously normative ways.99  Normative use of the bilateral sense of 
symmetry is especially common in contexts conventionally 
conceptualized in oppositional terms, such as questions of procedure in 
the adversary system100 and questions surrounding private economic 
transactions.101  In both contexts, scholars sometimes use the concept of 
symmetry to argue for the establishment of a regime that is asymmetrical 
in some way.  This type of argument presumes that a state of symmetry 
is the default norm and justifies departures from that norm.102  More 
                                                          
96 See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, Constitutional Asymmetry, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2073 (2001); 
Nelson Tebbe, Free Exercise and the Problem of Symmetry, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 699 (2005); 
Laurence H. Tribe, Disentangling Symmetries: Speech, Association, Parenthood, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 
641 (2001). 
97 See, e.g., Kenneth D. Heath, The Symmetries of Citizenship: Welfare, Expatriate Taxation, 
and Stakeholding, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 533 (1999) (addressing rules governing acquisition 
and relinquishment of citizenship along with federal statutory creation of financial burdens 
and benefits in the United States). 
98 See Katz, supra note 95; see also supra notes 24, 62-71 and accompanying text. 
99 Unlike contemporary courts, scholars virtually never use the term normatively in the 
holistic sense. 
100 This is true particularly in the context of criminal trials and sentencing.  See, e.g., 
Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Double Jeopardy’s Asymmetric Appeal Rights: What Purpose Do They 
Serve?, 82 B.U. L. REV. 341 (2002); Evan J. Mandery, Notions of Symmetry and Self in Death 
Penalty Jurisprudence (with Implications for the Admissibility of Victim Impact Evidence), 15 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 471 (2004); Stephen T. Parr, Symmetric Proportionality: A New 
Perspective on the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, 68 TENN. L. REV. 41 (2000). 
101 See, e.g., Paul J. Heald, Mowing the Playing Field: Addressing Information Distortion and 
Asymmetry in the TRIPS Game, 88 MINN. L. REV. 249 (2003); Edward M. Iacobucci & Ralph 
A. Winter, Asset Securitization and Asymmetric Information, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 161 (2005). 
102 For instance, Evan J. Mandery argues that evidentiary rules in capital sentencing 
hearings should be based on clearer awareness of the asymmetry of error risks in that 
context.  Mandery, supra note 100. 
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often, however, commentators present reflective symmetry as a norm 
toward which the existing asymmetrical regime should be reformed.103 
In a brief analysis of the function of the norm of bilateral symmetry 
in legal scholarship, Barbara Flagg and Katherine Goldwasser note 
commentators’ tendencies to presume symmetry as the default measure 
of “fairness.”104  They urge resistance to this tendency, contending that 
adherence to a norm of bilateral symmetry in legal reasoning and 
doctrine reinforces existing inegalitarian distributions of resources and 
power.105  Like the many similar critiques discussed in Part IV, however, 
this one ultimately depends on an appeal to the same norm.  Flagg and 
Goldwasser advocate doctrinal asymmetry in areas such as 
antidiscrimination and criminal law to counteract existing social and 
economic asymmetries—in other words, they presume that bilateral 
asymmetry, once perceived or conceived of, requires correction.106  Flagg 
and Goldwasser do not acknowledge this inconsistency or provide clear 
guidelines for distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable symmetries. 
Still, Flagg and Goldwasser’s general point is borne out by other 
scholars’ reliances on the concept to show the legitimacy of portions of 
the existing legal regime.107  This use of the concept of symmetry is 
similar to its use to organize a discussion; both rely on the concept to 
make an area of doctrine coherent.  But arguments justifying the status 
quo by reference to bilateral symmetry obviously add normative 
implications not present in purely organizational uses of the concept.  
Approaches in this vein propose that parts of the world should be 
perceived as or made symmetrical by courts and other legal actors.  In 
this, such normative arguments are similar to some of the uses of the 
concept in legal rhetoric discussed in Part IV.   
B. Robert Laurence’s Work on Indian Law 
One scholar, Robert Laurence, has critically examined the concept of 
symmetry before using it to organize his account of historical patterns in 
                                                          
103 Thus, Stephen T. Parr argues that existing Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause 
doctrine should be reformed so that disproportionally lenient penalties are also considered 
unconstitutional.  Parr, supra note 100; see also John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, 
Symmetric Entrenchment: A Constitutional and Normative Theory, 89 VA. L. REV. 385 (2003). 
104 Flagg & Goldwasser, supra note 91, at 108-09. 
105 Id. at 109-12. 
106 Id. at 108-09. 
107 See, e.g., Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the 
Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 (2003); Saul Levmore, Takings, 
Torts, and Special Interests, 77 VA. L. REV. 1333 (1991). 
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federal Indian law.108  Laurence’s analysis focuses on the sense of the 
term used in physics.  He makes this focus seem natural by noting how 
this sense of symmetry characterizes the laws of physics.  Laurence 
acknowledges only in passing, however, an important difference 
between the domains of physical and human “law,” noting that humans 
“construct[ ] the law; [they do] not just describe it,” as physicists claim to 
do.109  This Article considers this difference—the constructedness of 
law—to be more central than Laurence does to an understanding of how 
the concept of symmetry has functioned in legal thought and rhetoric.  
But Laurence’s analysis also yields important insights built on in the 
discussion below. 
For one thing, Laurence stresses the importance of perspective and 
frames of reference in the perception and attribution of symmetry.110  
Symmetry may be visible within one frame of reference but invisible 
within another:   
[I]magine a formal dinner in the State Dining Room at 
the White House, and begin with the china:  The plate in 
front of you is probably bilaterally symmetric, or 
perhaps symmetric about a point . . .  Pull back, and the 
place setting is bilaterally asymmetric:  forks on the left, 
knives and spoons on the right, napkin and crystal in a 
lopsided arrangement.  Pull back.  The table itself is 
likely bilaterally symmetric, with the same number of 
chairs on both sides.  (Or symmetric about the center if 
the table is round). . . . Pull back and the State Dining 
Room itself is revealed to be bilaterally asymmetric, with 
fireplaces on one side, but not the other.  Pull back, and 
the White House itself is largely a symmetric 
building . . . Pull back farther, and one sees the largely 
symmetric layout of Washington, D.C.  Finally, North 
America is . . . asymmetric when viewed from afar.111 
Laurence’s observations recall the critiques of the “asymmetric 
threat” concept discussed in Part I.112  His illustration reemphasizes the 
extent to which perceptions of symmetry result from processes of 
                                                          
108 See Laurence, supra note 90, at 865-934. 
109 Id. at 878. 
110 Many laws of physics, Laurence notes, “are not symmetric as to scale.”  Id. at 869. 
111 Id. at 870-72. 
112 See supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text. 
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selection and decision-making or selective inattention, even when they 
are experienced as passive reactions to the environment.   
Second, like Flagg and Goldwasser, Laurence questions the habit of 
unreflecting reliance on symmetry as a norm and advocates asymmetry 
in certain areas of legal doctrine.113  Also like Flagg and Goldwasser, he 
relies on the norm at the same time, noting that “asymmetry in the broad 
sense of departures from universal uniformity is at times essential for 
balance[,]” by which Laurence means the equilibrium of opposing forces 
or interests.114  Like Flagg and Goldwasser, Laurence does not explain 
when such equilibrium is desirable and when it is to be resisted.  
Ultimately, he too seems to consider the normative value of the concept 
to be self-evident.115 
Although Laurence’s analysis is more sustained than any other legal 
commentator’s, his perspective remains external.  No legal scholar has 
examined how the concept actually functions within legal rhetoric and, 
by implication, within legal thought.  This failure is unfortunate.  As the 
next sections attempt to show, these functions are fascinatingly pervasive 
and suggestive.  For a long time, they have been shaping legal reasoning 
and rhetoric in ways that we have never fully recognized. 
IV.  CONCEPTIONS OF SYMMETRY IN LEGAL RHETORIC AND REASONING 
From its origins, legal writing in the United States has consistently 
linked the three conceptions of symmetry described above to different 
aspects of the functions those writers tacitly declare the legal system, and 
particularly courts, to be performing.  These functions fall into five 
categories, which structure the discussion below:  doing justice, 
remaining faithful to the purposes of other lawmakers, making coherent 
law, correcting for market imperfections, and justifying conclusions. 
In each area, judicial opinion writers have used conceptions of 
symmetry to describe what they are doing, but they have also 
paradoxically used the concept to articulate the passivity of courts.  
Often, these writers use the concept of symmetry to locate the decision or 
norm that disposes of the issue at hand somewhere other than in the 
adjudicative process.  Even when the writers acknowledge their own 
responsibility for attributing symmetrical or asymmetrical relationships 
                                                          
113 See, e.g., Laurence, supra note 90, at 874-87. 
114 Id. at 880. 
115 Cf. WEYL, supra note 11, at 13 (“Even in asymmetric designs one feels symmetry as the 
norm from which one deviates under the influence of forces of non-formal character.”). 
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to phenomena, their use of the concepts rarely, if ever, acknowledges the 
contingency of these perceptions—the fact that symmetry is not inherent 
in the phenomena examined, but results from active selection of or 
selective inattention to features of those phenomena.  Like legal scholars, 
but for much longer, writers responsible for making law have largely 
treated conceptions of symmetry as self-evident principles driving 
reasoning and guiding decision-making.  The conceptions drive legal 
decision-making and articulation, but because their meanings and uses 
vary so widely, the meaning and significance of the concept is far from 
self-evident. 
A. Doing Justice 
1. Symmetry as Justice or Fairness   
Sometimes, opinion writers simply equate conceptions of symmetry 
with fairness or justice in the most abstract, general sense.  A writer 
implicitly asserts that a result is just because it is symmetrical, and vice 
versa, but does not otherwise explain the meaning of the concepts or the 
connection between them.  Early uses in this vein imply that the concepts 
entail one another, or that an asymmetrical result could not possibly be 
fair.116  Over time, opinion writers have come more often to present 
symmetry and justice as correlated properties of the correct result 
without asserting a logical relation between them.117  The concepts of 
symmetry and basic fairness remain strong rhetorical partners to this 
day.118   
These references to symmetry are usually so glancing that it is 
difficult to identify their relation to any particular cognitive schema or 
more specific conception of symmetry.  In recent opinions, such as 
Justice Scalia’s 2001 dissent in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, the 
                                                          
116 See, e.g., Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Holley, 30 Kan. 465, 473 (1883) (“Thus a symmetry and 
order will be preserved which will tend to secure truth and justice.”); Hertzog v. Ellis, 3 
Binn. 209, 1810 WL 1362, at *2 (Pa. Dec. 22, 1810) (argument for defendant) (referring to 
“defac[ing] and destroy[ing] the symmetry of judicial proceedings, which is as essential to 
their justice as it is to their beauty”). 
117 See, e.g., Sarlund v. Anderson, 205 F.3d 973, 974 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, J.) (“[The case 
being distinguished] shifts the emphasis from considerations of dignity, deterrence, 
respect, propriety, and symmetry found in a number of earlier cases . . . .”); Donatelli v. 
Nat’l Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459, 471 (1st Cir. 1990) (“[T]he inquiry illustrates the 
essential symmetry and fairness of the result which we reach . . . .”); Cavnar v. Quality 
Control Parking, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549, 553-54 (Tex. 1985) (“The time has come to revise 
the . . . rule to make injured parties whole and restore equity and symmetry to this area of 
the law.”). 
118 See discussion supra note 24. 
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reference often appears to be to reflective symmetry.119  But even when 
this is the case, such references carry holistic implications.  Equating 
symmetry with fairness allows a writer to justify a legal conclusion by 
characterizing it, impressionistically, as a perceptible whole embracing 
parts related in some satisfactory but unspecified manner.  
Opinion writers have also linked symmetry to fairness in more 
specific ways.  Some prevalent approaches link the concept of symmetry 
to fairness in various procedural aspects of adjudication.  Before 
describing these approaches, this discussion looks briefly at the types of 
contrasts opinion writers have drawn between symmetry and fairness. 
2. Fair Asymmetry   
Since at least the late nineteenth century, judicial writing has also 
repeatedly contrasted symmetry with fairness or justice.  This tradition 
defines the task of rendering justice in opposition to that of achieving or 
perceiving symmetry, which is usually in turn linked to other negatively 
valued concepts.  The approach hints at a self-aware use of the concept.  
But in various ways, writing using this approach usually stops short of 
full analysis and, like writing that links symmetry with fairness, backs 
off from assertions of agency.  The tendency is, instead, to acknowledge 
and then reject the self-evident attractiveness of symmetry in favor of the 
self-evident authority of another norm, presented as the basis for the 
result attained. 
This approach seems to have first appeared in late nineteenth-
century judicial opinions.  Courts at this time sometimes aligned their 
common-law functions with doing justice and opposed these tasks to 
legal “science”120 or “theory,”121 which they characterized as symmetrical 
in a sense combining implications of holism and correspondence or 
comprehensiveness and precision. 
                                                          
119 531 U.S. 533, 551 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
120 See Benton v. Burbank, 54 N.H. 583 (1874) (“If the question . . . were merely technical 
and abstract, or one having relation to the symmetry and consistency of the law as a science 
rather than to its practical application and administration, a decision in favor of the ruling 
would give occasion for less uneasiness.”). 
121 See Ash v. Cummings, 50 N.H. 591 (1872) (“[I]t is easy enough to give neat definitions 
and profound symmetrical theories; but the difficulty is, to make the definitions and 
theories square themselves with principles known to be sound . . . .”); see also George’s 
Radio v. Capital Transit Co., 126 F.2d 219, 223 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (Edgerton, J., dissenting) 
(citing Fleming James, Jr., Contribution Among Joint TortFeasors, A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 
HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1159 (1941)) (“The common law rule . . . should . . . be retained, even 
though it mars a theoretical symmetry in the law . . . .”). 
Petroski: The Rhetoric of Symmetry
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
1190 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
A more specific type of distinction between doing practical justice in 
the individual case and conforming to theoretical symmetries entered 
opinion writing around the turn of the twentieth century.122  An 
important example of this approach is Justice Holmes’s frequently 
quoted statement in his 1914 opinion for the Supreme Court in Patsone v. 
Pennsylvania:  “A lack of abstract symmetry does not matter.  The 
question is a practical one dependent upon experience.”123  This assertion 
seems at least to hint at a court’s active role in determining “practical” 
answers to questions on the basis of specific judicial and social 
“experience.”124  But similar, later references do not follow up on the 
hint.  Instead, in later opinions employing oppositions between 
particular facts and abstract symmetry,125 writers refer key decisions—
expressly turning in part on perspective-dependent perceptions of 
symmetry—to other bodies:  school districts, lower courts, and 
administrative agencies.126 
The contrast between practical reality and theoretical symmetry 
continues to function effectively in legal rhetoric127 and does not in every 
                                                          
122 See, e.g., Jordahl v. Berry, 75 N.W. 10, 11 (Minn. 1898) (“[I]t is more important to work 
practical justice than to preserve the logical symmetry of a rule . . . .”). 
123 232 U.S. 138, 144 (1914).  But compare Holmes’s famous dictum several decades earlier 
in THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).  In Patsone, the Court held that a state statute forbidding 
possession of a firearm by a noncitizen did not violate either treaty obligations or the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  The above language from Patsone is still quoted.  See, e.g., Walker 
v. Commonwealth, 127 S.W.3d 596, 603 (Ky. 2004). 
124 Patsone, 232 U.S. at 144. 
125 See Kemp v. Beasley, 389 F.2d 178, 190 (8th Cir. 1968) (“It is misleading to think that 
‘balance’ means exact symmetry or equilibrium of the races.  Numerical quotas or 
percentages, although appealing for their simplicity, lack that equitable flexibility . . . .”); 
Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1, 24 (5th Cir. 1966) (“Although there is an apparent appeal to the 
ostensibly logical symmetry of a declaration forbidding race consideration in both 
exclusion and inclusion, it is both theoretically and actually unrealistic.”); Mary Carter 
Paint Co. v. FTC, 333 F.2d 654, 660 (5th Cir. 1964) (Brown, J., concurring specially) (“The 
variety of problems dealt with [by administrative agencies] make . . . perfect symmetry[ ] 
impossible.  And the law reflects its good sense by not exacting it.”). 
126 In Kemp v. Beasley, the Eighth Circuit concluded that race-based assignment of faculty 
to schools to correspond with the racial makeup of the student bodies violated equal 
protection principles.  389 F.2d 178, 190 (1968).  In Brooks v. Beto, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a 
trial court’s refusal to grant a new trial on the ground of claimed jury bias due to 
disproportionate racial representation.  366 F.2d 1, 24 (1968).  In Mary Carter Paint Co., 
Judge Brown opposed symmetry to practicality in agency decision-making to establish a 
general presumption of legitimacy for such decision-making.  333 F.2d 654, 660 (1964). 
127 See, e.g., Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 25 (1980) (Burger, J.) (“While 
symmetry of results may be intellectually satisfying, it is not required.”); Lumen Constr., 
Inc. v. Brant Constr. Co., Inc., 780 F.2d 691, 695 (7th Cir. 1985) (“In analyzing whether 
[abstention is indicated], we look not for formal symmetry between the two actions, but for 
a substantial likelihood that the state litigation will dispose of all claims . . . .”); see also 
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case involve a denial of judicial agency.128  Yet it most often seems to 
involve such a denial.  Opinion and other writers frequently refer to the 
intuited and unelaborated dictates of “practical experience” as self-
evident alternative rules of decision.  Moreover, even when they reject 
the concept of symmetry as a norm, these writers link the concept to 
passivity.  References to the priority of experience over abstraction tend, 
when they explain the rejection of symmetry at all, to explain that 
rejection on the basis of the inflexibility of the concept of symmetry 
rather than on that of its contingent nature, which might lend it to 
arbitrary application and unpredictable results.129  In this connection, 
symmetry is rejected because it does not permit active decision-making, 
or requires an unnecessary and deliberate deviation from the intuitively 
correct result. 
To be fair, the approaches discussed so far appear in general 
statements that the opinion writers themselves likely would not deny are 
conclusory.  But similar patterns appear when those writers use the 
concept to describe more specific aspects of courts’ roles in ensuring 
procedural fairness.  The next sections address four forms of this 
approach. 
3. Symmetry in Civil Procedure 
Despite large shifts in the practical details of civil procedure, United 
States opinion writers have consistently tied the concept of symmetry to 
judicial responsibilities in this area.  Nineteenth-century opinions 
frequently referred to the “symmetry” of special pleading, drawing on 
the holistic sense of symmetry to defend and justify legal fictions and 
pleading requirements.130  As special pleading systems eroded, these 
                                                                                                                                  
Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 396 (2004) (Justice Stevens’s dissent is discussed in Part 
IV.E.2.). 
128 See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 325 (1971) 
(White, J.) (“[T]he application of res judicata in this case makes the law asymmetrical.  But 
the achievement of substantial justice rather than symmetry is the measure of the fairness 
of the rules of res judicata.”). 
129 A less common opposition presents symmetry as contrary to fairness.  See, e.g., Dretke 
v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 396 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  This opposition is closely tied to 
the presentation of symmetry as a cognitive distraction, discussed in Part IV.E.2. 
130 See, e.g., Slater v. Emerson, 60 U.S. 224, 230 (1856) (argument of plaintiff) 
(“[T]he . . . symmetry of pleading . . . requires . . . an allegation of complete 
performance . . . .”); Biggam v. Merritt, 1 Miss. 430 (1831) (referring to “fictions of 
law . . . necessary to preserve the harmony and symmetry of its proceedings”); Shaw v. 
Redmond, 1824 WL 2313, 11 Serg. & Rawle 27, at *7 (Pa. 1824) (referring to “an 
excrescence . . . disfiguring the admirable symmetry of the law, and the just and beautiful 
proportions of special pleading”). 
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writers persisted in linking symmetry to the judiciary’s role in ensuring 
procedural fairness.  In the mid- and late nineteenth century, opinion 
writers used the concept to present legislative reforms as incursions on 
the beauty of holistically symmetrical, judicially developed procedural 
requirements131 or, under a statutory pleading system, to justify judicial 
action in reforming pleadings.132   
These approaches seem to have disappeared in the early twentieth 
century.  Eventually they were replaced by a different notion of judicial 
management.  Beginning around the early 1980s, opinion writers have 
increasingly aligned the concept of symmetry with their role in 
preserving the proper balance of risks, opportunities, and power 
between the parties in a bilaterally symmetrical adversarial system.133  
This reliance on the bilateral sense of symmetry in the civil procedure 
context seems to have appeared around the same time as widespread use 
of the bilateral schema to identify courts’ roles in several other areas, as 
discussed below.134 
Opinion writers have thus long appealed to symmetry as a positively 
valued concept in connection with civil procedure, although this history 
falls into two distinct phases.  With increasing frequency, however, 
writers are also resisting this linkage, aligning courts’ procedural 
                                                          
131 See, e.g., Butler v. Wentworth, 9 How. Pr. 282, 17 Barb. 649 (N.Y. Sup. 1854) (Clerke, J., 
dissenting) (referring to “the original system of pleading, before its symmetry was 
disfigured by ill-considered legislation and judicial expedients”); O’Neal v. O’Neal, 1842 
WL 4800, 4 Watts & Serg. 130 (Pa. 1842) (“[T]he symmetry of legal proceedings has yielded 
in England to legislative measures of convenience; and, in our own state, much more 
so . . . .”). 
132 See, e.g., The Sapphire, 78 U.S. 164, 168 (1870) (Bradley, J.) (“If a substitution of names 
is necessary or proper it . . . can be made by the court under its general power to preserve 
due symmetry in its forms of proceeding.”); Brickman v. S.C. R.R. Co., 8 S.C. 173 (1876) 
(“[A]mendment after judgment is of the utmost importance . . . to give symmetry to the 
system of pleading adopted by the Code.”). 
133 See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 638 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(“Without transient jurisdiction, an asymmetry would arise: A transient would have the 
full benefit of the power of the forum State’s courts as a plaintiff while retaining immunity 
from their authority as a defendant.”); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 764 (1982) 
(Blackmun, J.) (“The disparity between the adversaries’ litigation resources is matched by a 
striking asymmetry in their litigation options.”); Frietsch v. Refco, Inc., 56 F.3d 825, 828 (7th 
Cir. 1995) (noting that where “the plaintiffs would have a choice of venues but [the 
defendant] would not, . . . there is no reason for such an asymmetry of procedural 
choices”); Deakle v. John E. Graham & Sons, 756 F.2d 821, 833 (11th Cir. 1985) 
(“Symmetrical treatment should be given to the estimated lost earnings both before and 
after trial so that neither party can benefit . . . .”); Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 912 
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (“[D]efending and plaintiffs’ counsel . . . should have compensation 
of . . . the same amplitude. There is a logical symmetry in this principle.”). 
134 See infra Parts IV.A.4-IV.A.5, IV.D. 
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responsibilities with adjustments in the interests of asymmetrical 
fairness.135  This countercurrent is especially visible in the context of civil 
rights fee awards.136  The continued sway of the concept of symmetry in 
this area is revealed by the form taken by statements of the need for 
procedural asymmetry, which justify the apparent imbalance as a 
mechanism for rectification of preexisting asymmetries in resources or 
incentives.  Like the approach taken by Flagg and Goldwasser, and like 
other judicial approaches to fair asymmetry, these statements seem to 
presuppose that symmetry is a measure of fairness, even if a certain 
superficial symmetry is not fair in the case at hand. 
Opinion writers have thus regularly used the concept of symmetry 
to acknowledge the role of the judicial system in controlling the course of 
civil litigation, but the nature of this acknowledgment has shifted.  
Nineteenth-century writers were willing to describe themselves as the 
calibrators of a judicially constructed system.  Today, writers are more 
likely to describe procedural decisions as technical adjustments in 
response to a self-evident, easily reinstated binary balance.  In this way, 
opinion writers’ acknowledgment of their active involvement in making 
procedural decisions has diminished. 
4. Symmetry in Criminal Procedure 
Until well into the twentieth century, judicial opinions did not 
commonly refer to symmetry or asymmetry in the criminal context.137  
But the dialectic implicit in earlier references to justified asymmetry has 
also recently emerged in this area, as opinion writers have come 
consistently to refer to courts’ duty to safeguard mechanisms of 
                                                          
135 See, e.g., Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d 436, 441 (7th Cir. 1995) (urging “a balance between the 
total advantages enjoyed by each side rather than an insistence on symmetry at every stage 
in the process”). 
136 See, e.g., Sanglap v. LaSalle Bank, 345 F.3d 515, 520 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Fee shifting under 
the ADA, like other civil rights statutes, is asymmetric . . . .”); Monroe v. Children’s Home 
Ass’n of Ill., 128 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 1997) (Easterbrook, J.) (“Fee-shifting provisions in 
the civil rights laws are asymmetric.”). 
137 The earliest examples located in research for this project are State v. Morrison, 64 Ind. 
141 (1878) (“This makes the criminal system . . . the more symmetrical.”); and State v. 
Baldwin, 36 Kan. 1 (1886) (“The charge given was clear and symmetrical, and embraced the 
law of all proper requests made by the defendant . . . .”).  See also Edwards v. United States, 
312 U.S. 473, 482 (1941) (“The refusal to permit the accused to prove his defense may prove 
trivial . . .  Procedural errors often are.  But procedure is the skeleton which forms and 
supports the whole structure of a case.  The lack of a bone mars the symmetry of the 
body.”); Johnson v. State, 198 Ark. 871 (1939) (“[I]t is more important that the law’s 
symmetry be preserved than it is that a criminal be punished in a particular case.”).  Similar 
usages do not become numerically significant until after 1969. 
Petroski: The Rhetoric of Symmetry
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
1194 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
procedural asymmetry, usually to correct preexisting asymmetries of 
power between prosecutors and criminal defendants.  Often, opinions 
trace this duty to the Constitution, rather than to the courts’ own 
decision-making powers.  In 1997, for instance, the Ninth Circuit noted 
that the “asymmetr[ical],” defendant-focused guarantees of the Bill of 
Rights “help[ ] explain why application of the rule of evidence 
is . . . asymmetrical between defense and prosecution.”138  
Opinions addressing the adjudication of criminal issues also 
sometimes present a fair result in an individual case in opposition to 
symmetry, in the sense of precise correspondence or regularity—a value 
these writers nevertheless stop short of categorically rejecting.139  But this 
approach, too, seems to have appeared later in the criminal context than 
in other areas of law.   
Given the long availability elsewhere of the concepts involved in 
both approaches, it is not easy to explain the delay in their appearance in 
the criminal context.  If references to symmetry function both to describe 
the judicial role and to signal judicial passivity, however, such references 
could well seem out of place in the criminal context, where the coercive, 
and hence active, face of the legal system is highly apparent.  It may be 
telling that the only sense of symmetry that appears in the criminal 
context is the bilateral sense, which implies both action and its absence.  
5. Symmetry in Remedies  
Courts are also highly active when they order and review remedies 
in civil actions.  In this area, more clearly than in the criminal context, 
opinion writers have tended to use references to symmetry to articulate 
courts’ passivity. 
Early approaches presented particular remedies as necessary to 
preserve or reinstate the holistic symmetry of equity or of legal 
                                                          
138 United States v. Paguio, 114 F.3d 928, 934 (9th Cir. 1997); see also United States v. 
Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975) (Marshall, J.) (“[P]ermitting review of all claimed legal 
errors would have symmetry to recommend it . . . .  But . . . the Double Jeopardy Clause 
militate[s] against permitting the Government to appeal . . . .”); United States v. Harbin, 250 
F.3d 532, 540 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Due process does not require absolute symmetry between 
rights granted to the prosecution and those afforded the defense.”); United States v. 
Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 774 (2d Cir. 1980) (“A criminal prosecution . . . is in no sense a 
symmetrical proceeding.”). 
139 See, e.g., United States v. Shead, 568 F.2d 678, 684 (10th Cir. 1978) (“The Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses do not command symmetry within the probation and parole 
systems.”); cf. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 396 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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doctrine.140  In the mid-nineteenth century, advocates and opinion 
writers began to stress not just the comprehensive holism of the law, but 
also consistency among remedies and correspondence between rights 
and remedies.141  The focus in this slightly more active approach is on 
matching remedial choices with their naturally corresponding rights or 
with the remedies afforded others in corresponding situations. 
This approach persists,142 but in the past two and a half decades 
writers of judicial opinions have increasingly articulated conclusions 
about appropriate remedies using references to bilateral reflective 
symmetry.  This trend is not confined to civil litigation,143 but it is 
particularly common in civil cases, especially in those turning on the 
fairness of remedies contracted for by the parties.144  In this context, 
writers for courts are more likely to cast the courts as relatively passive 
enforcers of remedies determined outside the legal system. 
                                                          
140 See Lee v. Lee, 9 Pa. 169 (1848) (stating that the appropriate “remedy [is] a new 
trial . . . The symmetry of our system is thereby preserved”); Richards v. McDaniel, 9 S.C.L. 
18, 1818 WL 731 (S.C. Const. App. 1818) (noting that under proposed construction, “the 
mischief and the remedy may be more distinctly seen and applied, [establishing] a system 
perfect in its symmetry”). 
141 See, e.g., Clark v. Douglas, 62 Pa. 408 (1869) (“Nothing can be more just, consistent and 
symmetrical than the system of administering the law here indicated; for . . . it gives a 
remedy for every wrong . . . .”); Juvenal v. Patterson, 10 Pa. 282, 1849 WL 5609, at *2 (Pa. 
1849) (Rogers, J.) (“[I]t is not easy to perceive why . . . [the plaintiff] is not entitled to a 
remedy commensurate with her rights.  This preserves the symmetry of the case . . . .”). 
142 For examples of the correspondence and consistency approach, see, e.g., Linder v. 
Berge, 567 F. Supp. 913, 917 (D.R.I. 1983) (Selya, J.) (describing the need to prevent 
“engraft[ing] onto the law” “an inexplicable asymmetry between railroad workers and 
other union members in the fashioning of remedies”); and Collier v. Insignia Fin. Group, 981 
P.2d 321, 326 (Okla. 1999) (referring to need to avoid “the pitfall of according asymmetrical 
remedies to members of a single class of . . . victims”).  For examples of the fair-asymmetry 
approach, see United States v. Telluride Co., 146 F.3d 1241, 1247 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that 
“the lack of precise symmetry between actual damages . . . and the costs of mitigation or 
the costs of the sanction, does not change the nature of the remedy”); and Kalman Floor Co., 
Inc. v. Jos. L. Muscarelle, Inc., 481 A.2d 553, 560 (N.J. Super. 1984) (noting “no reason why 
justice should require perfect symmetry of remedy”). 
143 See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 763 (2005) (Breyer, J.); United States v. 
Castillo, 406 F.3d 806, 826-27 (7th Cir. 2005) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting from denial of en 
banc rehearing) (describing “the reason the remedial opinion in Booker made the Guidelines 
advisory across the board” as a desire to avoid the “asymmetric” “alternative”). 
144 See, e.g., McKinley Assocs., Inc. v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 110 F. Supp. 2d 169, 187 n.9 
(W.D.N.Y. 2000) (“[T]he Agreement [between the parties] . . . although not creating perfect 
symmetry regarding remedies, does not leave McKinley defenseless.”); Goodwin v. Ford 
Motor Credit Co., 970 F. Supp. 1007, 1012 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (noting authority indicating that 
“both sides may have to have symmetrical remedies in an adhesion contract, or it may be 
found unconscionable”). 
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An unusually nuanced analysis of bilaterally symmetrical remedial 
relationships appears in the 2000 opinion of the California Supreme 
Court in Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services.145  Writing for 
the court, Justice Mosk noted that parties are generally “free to contract 
for asymmetrical remedies and arbitration clauses of varying scope”146 
before holding that adhesion contracts containing unilateral arbitration 
clauses are per se unconscionable.  The Armendariz opinion devotes 
much analysis to justification of the latter holding, which depended in 
part on a judicial determination of the asymmetry in bargaining power 
between the parties to the agreement in question.147  The space the 
opinion devotes to this explanation makes sense in light of the fact that 
the court’s holding was a significant departure from the background 
presumption against which it was operating, expressed in the quotation 
above:  private individuals are generally responsible for engineering 
their own bilateral relationships and determining the forums in which to 
resolve their disputes.  This presumption suggests that, in many cases, 
adjudicators should not even take a first step toward analysis of the 
fairness of agreements, as such fairness is ordinarily a matter of how the 
bargain looks from the parties’ perspectives.  An agreement that seems 
bilaterally asymmetrical to outside parties may not seem unfair to the 
parties to the agreement. 
Armendariz is an exception proving the rule regarding the rhetoric of 
judicial passivity.  By presenting the court’s imposition of symmetry on 
the contractual relationship as a deviation from the default rule, this 
opinion shows how, even when opinion writers are at their most self-
aware in acknowledging the contingency of perceptions of symmetry, 
those writers describe the courts’ role as primarily passive. 
6. Symmetrical Treatment of Like Cases Alike 
Perhaps the most prevalent link between symmetry and norms of 
procedural fairness occurs across almost all types of litigation.  This 
approach, unlike many of those discussed above, draws primarily on the 
sense of symmetry as precise correspondence, not holistic integration or 
bilateral reflection, and aligns it with the like treatment of like cases.148  
Although United States advocates and opinion writers have drawn this 
                                                          
145 24 Cal. 4th 83 (2000). 
146 Id. at 118. 
147 Id. at 115-21. 
148 See WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY, supra note 28, at 185-229; RAWLS, supra note 92, at 
83-90. 
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connection for more than two centuries, their manner of doing so has 
changed.   
Throughout the nineteenth century, judicial opinions made 
summary references to symmetry as correlated with unelaborated 
concepts of uniformity and consistency.149  This correlation implies some 
sense of the like treatment of like cases, but, around the 1860s, advocates 
and opinions increasingly began to make this implication—that 
symmetrical treatment is the treatment of like cases alike and vice 
versa—more explicit.150   
Subsequent discussions have added new details to this approach.  
Twentieth-century opinion writers, for instance, have linked symmetry 
to a need for interjurisdictional doctrinal correspondence.  An important 
example is Justice Douglas’s opinion in Mapp v. Ohio, which 
characterized Mapp as “an appropriate case in which to put an end to the 
asymmetry which Wolf151 imported into the law.”152  (In Wolf, the Court 
                                                          
149 See, e.g., Barstow v. Adams, 2 Day 70 (Conn. 1805) (“[T]he construction put upon the 
act . . . is . . . necessary to preserve the symmetry and uniformity of the system.”); Burnham 
v. De Bevorse, 8 How. Pr. 159 (N.Y. 1853) (indicating that result would be compelled “as 
long as legal proceedings retain any . . . consistency and symmetry”); Clark v. Douglass, 62 
Pa. 408 (1869) (“Nothing can be more just, consistent and symmetrical than the system of 
administering the law here indicated . . . .”); Irish v. Clayes, 10 Vt. 81 (1838) (referring to 
“every rule of consistency and symmetry” as dictating holding in case); see also JAMES 
KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 444-45 (14th ed. 1896) (“Twenty-six independent 
state courts of final jurisdiction over the same questions, arising upon the same general 
code of common and of equity law, must necessarily impair the symmetry of that code.”). 
150 See, e.g., Wood v. Truckee Turnpike Co., 24 Cal. 474 (1864) (“[S]ymmetry of decision 
requires that the like rule should be applied in the case of turnpike corporations . . . .”); 
Appeal of Roberts, 39 Pa. 417 (1861) (“[T]his general and just principle would be violated, 
and the symmetry of our system would be marred, if parental succession, like all other 
successions, were not made to conform to it . . . .”).  The development of a sense of 
symmetry as precise correspondence of applicable principles from case to case coincided 
with the systematization and solidification of legal doctrine in the mid-nineteenth century.  
See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 253-66 
(1977). 
151 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (holding Fourth Amendment applicable to the 
states, but declining to hold the exclusionary rule applicable against state officials in state 
courts, even though the rule had applied in federal courts since the decision in Weeks v. 
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)). 
152 367 U.S. 643, 670 (1960) (Douglas, J., concurring); see, e.g., Conetta v. Nat’l Hair Care 
Ctrs., Inc., 236 F.3d 67, 78 (1st Cir. 2001) (“[T]he applicable federal and state claims appear 
to be wholly symmetrical . . . .”); In re Johnson, 691 F.2d 249, 256 (6th Cir. 1982) (describing 
case law as “reflect[ing] a concern that there be some symmetry between the bankruptcy 
laws and state laws governing the definition of ‘property’”); Saffron v. Dep’t of the Navy, 
561 F.2d 938, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (noting the “symmetry between . . . courts which 
Congress has endeavored to promote”).  But see Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 224 (1996) 
(Breyer, J.). 
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had held that the Fourth Amendment applied to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, but declined to make the exclusionary rule, 
already available in federal court, applicable in state courts against state 
actors.)  Since the 1980s, opinion writers have also identified symmetry-
as-correspondence with stare decisis and precedential reasoning.153  
Although it would seem difficult for an opinion writer to deny that 
the responsibility for ensuring case-to-case consistency rests with the 
courts themselves, all of the above approaches to the like treatment of 
like cases also often obscure the courts’ active role in decision-making.  
The identification of formal equality with the sense of symmetry as 
precise correspondence purports to specify each concept, but it often 
functions only to extend a halo of self-evident normative value around 
both.  The sense of symmetry as precise correspondence connotes the 
type of lawlike regularity found in scientific disciplines and a form of 
reproduction one step removed from human activity, although 
ultimately traceable to human initiative.154  These conceptions convey 
predictability, but the predictability depends in part on freedom from 
immediate human interference.  Identifying formal justice with this sense 
of symmetry may represent another aspect of unwillingness to 
acknowledge the work done by courts and opinion writers—in this 
context, the choices they must make to draw parallels between cases. 
B. Remaining Faithful to the Purposes of Lawmakers 
The previous section focused on how legal rhetoric sometimes 
spotlights the action of courts as the renderers of justice, and it suggested 
that opinion writers have increasingly tended to obscure their own 
decision-making agency in this connection.  Denials of this type are not 
always covert.  This section discusses two long traditions of open denials 
of judicial agency.   
                                                          
153 See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 219 (2000) 
(“There is symmetry then in the holding here and in Rosenberger.”); In re Balfour MacLaine 
Int’l Ltd., 85 F.3d 68, 78 (2d Cir. 1996) (“The situation is symmetrical to one where the all 
risk insurer must prove there is no coverage of a loss . . . .”); Autotrol Corp. v. Cont’l. Water 
Sys. Corp., 918 F.2d 689, 694 (7th Cir. 1990) (“The proper analysis of that case is 
symmetrical with the proper analysis of our case.”); Zinser v. Cont’l Grain Co., 660 F.2d 
754, 760 (10th Cir. 1981) (referring to Supreme Court’s reasoning in an earlier case as 
“[e]xtending the rule of Hanover Shoe in what it believed to be a symmetrical fashion”). 
154 See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text. 
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1. Faithfulness to Legislatures 
Congress itself has very rarely used the term “symmetry” in its 
enactments.155  This fact may underscore the centrality of the concept of 
symmetry to legal and judicial rhetoric and, particularly, to the acts of 
self-justification not typically required of legislatures.  Advocates and 
opinion writers, in contrast, have long posited the achievement of 
abstract symmetry as among a legislature’s chief purposes.  Nineteenth-
century writers drew consistent parallels between symmetry and “the 
obvious intent of the legislator.”156  These early references, like many of 
those discussed in previous sections, are to the holistic sense of the term. 
Twentieth-century opinion writers have continued to describe 
legislative purposes by reference to a norm of symmetry, although the 
sense implied has shifted toward that of precise correspondence and 
away from that of holism.157  But in the twentieth century, opinion 
writers asserting deference to legislatures have also often declared that 
symmetry is not among a legislature’s usual or achievable goals, and 
                                                          
155 The only metaphorical references to symmetry or asymmetry in extant acts of 
Congress are very recent invocations of “asymmetric threats.”  In statutes setting forth the 
reporting duties of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Defense Secretary, Congress 
provided that these reports are to include a “description of the international threats posed 
by terrorism . . . and asymmetric challenges to United States national security[,]” 10 U.S.C. 
§ 153(d)(2)(D) (2000 & Supp. 2004) (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs), and “the most 
significant . . . capabilities . . . necessary for the armed forces to prevail against the most 
dangerous threats, including asymmetrical threats, . . . to the national security interests of 
the United States,” 10 U.S.C. § 486(c)(1) (Defense Secretary).  The term also appears in 
recent defense spending bills.  See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 108-375, div. A, tit. I, § 141, 118 Stat. 
1829 (2004). 
156 Carpenter v. Hoyt, 17 Ill. 529 (1856); see also King v. Fraser, 23 S.C. 543 (1885) (report of 
special master) (referring to legislature’s efforts at “systematizing our . . . law” and court’s 
duty “to sustain and promote this effort at symmetry”); Gibbons v. Brittenum, 56 Miss. 232 
(1878) (noting that provisions, “though adopted on different days . . . were intended to 
form parts of a symmetrical and harmonious whole”); Glamorgan Iron Co. v. Snyder, 84 
Pa. 397 (1877) (noting that two “statutes are . . . to be construed as parts of a system 
designed to be general and symmetrical”). 
157 See, e.g., Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1134 (9th Cir. 2003) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (noting that a court is to “presume[ ] congressional intent to create a 
‘symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme’” (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Co., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)) (“A court must therefore interpret the statute ‘as a 
symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme . . . .’” (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 
U.S. 561 (1995)))); In re Newbury Café, Inc., 841 F.2d 20, 22 (1st Cir. 1988) (“It is only 
reasonable to assume that the drafters of the Code . . . would not, without good cause, 
break up its symmetry.”); Sykes v. Tex. Air Corp., 834 F.2d 488, 491 (5th Cir. 1987) (“We 
cannot imagine that Congress actually intended such a perverse asymmetry . . . .”); United 
Gas Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 350 F.2d 689, 695 (5th Cir. 1965) (“It is not forbidden judicial 
legislation to give Congress credit for desiring symmetry.”). 
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thus should not guide statutory interpretation.158  This approach is 
clearly a variation on the opposition between practical reality and 
abstract symmetry described above.  In the statutory context, however, 
opinion writers locate the need to deal with complex reality in the 
legislature, rather than in the courts.  Thus, this usage is not a means of 
asserting judicial activity, but a statement of reasons for the denial of 
such activity.  It characterizes legislation as the unexaminable product of 
a purely political process of accommodating interests and facts.  In so 
doing, it also implies the impossibility of meaningful judicial analysis of 
legislation.  
The consistency of rhetorical postures of passivity in the area of 
statutory interpretation is hardly surprising.  For related reasons, 
opinion writers have assumed a similar posture in describing courts’ 
roles in conducting judicial review of the constitutionality of 
legislation.159  
2. Faithfulness to the Purposes of the Makers of the Constitution 
This discussion has already noted a few ways in which constitutional 
adjudication has found asymmetry in the Constitution, particularly in its 
guarantees of the rights of criminal defendants.160  This section focuses 
on the ways constitutional adjudication has linked symmetry with the 
conceptualization of separations of powers. 
Even before judges began to interpret and apply the Constitution, 
James Madison described the constitutional scheme of divided powers as 
asymmetrical in two of the Federalist Papers.  Madison’s approach to the 
concept is unusually nuanced.  In both essays, he recognizes that an 
arrangement lacking apparent symmetry, in the holistic sense, may seem 
intuitively wrong, but that the attribution of any such harmony to the 
arrangement is ultimately a matter of perspective.161  Most judicial 
                                                          
158 See, e.g., Jankowski-Burczyk v. INS, 291 F.3d 172, 176 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Congress may 
enact a regulatory measure . . . without a rationale for the resulting lack of symmetry.”); 
United States v. McDowell, 117 F.3d 974, 977 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[S]ymmetry is not always 
Congress’s paramount objective.”); Ind. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. 
Reserve Sys., 890 F.2d 1275, 1282 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[T]his would not be the first time that 
Congress has adjusted the competing positions of strong forces with a compromise of 
imperfect symmetry.”); United States v. Shirah, 253 F.2d 798, 800 (4th Cir. 1958) (“[C]ourts 
are not free to rewrite legislative enactments to give effect to the judges’ ideas of . . . the 
desirability of symmetry in statutes.”). 
159 See, e.g., BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 86, at 2. 
160 See supra notes 123-24, 138-39 and accompanying text. 
161 In Federalist No. 37, discussing “The Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a 
Proper Form of Government,” Madison asked, 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 3 [2007], Art. 8
http://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss3/8
2007] The Rhetoric of Symmetry 1201 
references to the symmetry or asymmetry of the Constitution have been 
more cursory than Madison’s.162  For instance, to support his argument 
for federal Supreme Court review of state court judgments in Cohens v. 
Virginia, Justice Marshall quoted the following appeal to the holistic 
sense of symmetry from the Virginia legislature’s session records:  “The 
duties [that the Justices of the United States Supreme Court] have to 
perform will lead them necessarily to the most enlarged and accurate 
acquaintance with the jurisdiction of the federal, and several State 
Courts, together with the admirable symmetry of our Government.”163  
Opinion writers have continued to appeal to the symmetry of the 
institutional structures created by the Constitution to support 
conclusions regarding government power.  In 1985, for instance, Chief 
Judge Clark, writing for the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 
referred to the “constitutional symmetry among the branches” of the 
federal government in adjudicating the constitutionality of congressional 
extension of bankruptcy judges’ terms in office.164  However, it is 
difficult to find many recent examples of appeals to the symmetry or 
asymmetry of the constitutional scheme that, like Justice Marshall’s, 
foreground judicial power.165  In describing their relationship to the 
structure of or established by the Constitution, opinion writers 
increasingly obscure rather than foreground the activity of courts.  In the 
                                                                                                                                  
Would it be wonderful [i.e., surprising] if, under the pressure of all 
these difficulties [inherent in constitutional engineering and the 
negotiation of conflicting interests], the convention should have been 
forced into some deviations from that artificial structure and regular 
symmetry which an abstract view of the subject might lead an 
ingenious theorist to bestow on a Constitution planned in his closet or 
in his imagination? 
FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison); see also FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison); cf. JOSEPH 
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 163, 1905 (1833). 
162 See, e.g., Hunter v. Martin, 4 Munf. 1, 18 Va. 1 (1815) (supporting argument for 
preclusion of federal Supreme Court review of state court judgments with statement that 
proposed approach “will keep up and perfect the symmetry between this and every other 
part of the constitution”). 
163 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 358 n.23 (1821) (citing Extract from the Journal of the 
Senate of the Commonwealth of Virginia, Richmond, Dec. 4, 1809). 
164 Matter of Koerner, 800 F.2d 1358, 1367 (5th Cir. 1986); see also Stockton & Visalia R. Co. 
v. Common Council of Stockton, 41 Cal. 147 (1871) (reasoning against conclusion that 
would “permanently mar the symmetry of the structure of the Government itself”); 
Taggart v. Commonwealth, 102 Pa. 354 (1883) (“The construction [suggested] . . . would 
seem to indicate a fundamental fault . . . destructive of the symmetrical system devised by 
the Constitution . . . .”); Att’y Gen. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 35 Wis. 425 (1874) (noting 
“the symmetrical distribution of judicial powers in the constitution”). 
165 But see State v. Hayne, 4 S.C. 403 (1873) (“If the Constitution should lose symmetry in 
consequence of our judicial exposition of its terms, the responsibility would not rest on the 
framers of that instrument.”). 
Petroski: The Rhetoric of Symmetry
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
1202 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
area of constitutional adjudication, perhaps more than in other areas, the 
pressures driving this tendency have been well-examined.  
Commentators often note the absence of a clear warrant for judicial 
review166 and the frequent desirability of judicial passivity,167 or at least 
minimalism,168 in constitutional adjudication.  The next section addresses 
two areas in which the virtues of passivity are less apparent and have 
less frequently been defended by commentators.  
C. Making Coherent Law 
Opinion writers have long articulated the courts’ role as the 
institutional guardian of the common law using references to symmetry 
to characterize the doctrine to which judicial opinions contribute and are 
ostensibly bound.  An almost equally long tradition involves references 
to symmetry in connection with recognition of the courts’ role as a 
statutory interpreter, rather than a diviner of legislative intent.  In both 
areas, opinion writers consistently represent the courts’ role  of ensuring 
coherence in the relevant legal domain.169  But from the very beginning, 
writers have also represented this role as one involving the restoration or 
preservation of a prior legal coherence—that is, they have described the 
role as largely passive.  
1. Statutory Coherence 
In a tradition complementing that of legislative deference, advocates 
and opinion writers have linked symmetry not to the creation of the 
statutory scheme, but to the nature of the scheme itself.170  This approach 
                                                          
166 See, e.g., BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 86, at 2-15. 
167 See generally id.; ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL 
THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006); JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 
(1999); Bickel, The Passive Virtues, supra note 85. 
168 CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 
(1999). 
169 This presentation is related to a powerful vein of jurisprudential commentary.  See, 
e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 176-224 (1988) (presenting theory of “law as 
integrity,” under which “lawmakers . . . try to make the total set of laws morally coherent” 
and “see[ the law] as coherent in that way”); Joseph Raz, The Relevance of Coherence, 72 B.U. 
L. REV. 273 (1992); Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 
YALE L.J. 949 (1988).  Dan Simon approaches the norm of coherence from another 
perspective, arguing that our inbuilt drive toward cognitive coherence is a significant 
constraint on legal decision-making.  See works cited supra note 55. 
170 This link may involve focus on statutory text, but need not do so.  Courts also 
attribute symmetry to abstract conceptual relationships within a statutory scheme.  See, e.g., 
Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528, 538, 540 (1978) (majority op. and op. of Powell, J., 
dissenting) (noting “the logical symmetry between the gain recognized at the shareholder 
level and the dividend credit allowed at the corporate level” and preference for “a 
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is best understood as a variation on the posture of deference to the 
legislature’s will, even though it does not expressly posit such a will.   
In one version of this approach, writers present symmetry and 
coherence as identical, immanent in the statutory scheme, and indicative 
of other positive norms.  The norm most often linked to symmetry and 
coherence in this way is consistency or logical noncontradiction.171  In the 
early and mid-nineteenth century, advocates and judges often aligned 
symmetry and coherence with uniformity, an even more holistic 
concept.172  Recently, opinion writers seem to have begun to use 
“symmetry” to refer to coherence arising from structural parallelism, or 
correspondence, between individual statutory provisions.173 
Opinion writers do not always identify the statutory scheme with 
symmetry.  References to the necessary asymmetry of statutes first 
emerged around the turn of the twentieth century, roughly when the 
opposition between practical justice and theoretical symmetry also 
                                                                                                                                  
resolution that advanced the symmetry of the relevant Code provisions”).  In another 
tradition, courts invoke statutory symmetry as an indication of legislative intent.  The idea 
is not that the legislature intended symmetry as such, but that the symmetry of the scheme 
indicates something about a more specific legislative purpose.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Chavarria-Herrara, 15 F.3d 1033, 1035 (11th Cir. 1994) (“The symmetrical structure of § 
3742 indicates that Congress intended appellate review of sentences to be available to the 
government . . . . The legislative history confirms this symmetry.”); United States v. Kurka, 
818 F.2d 1427, 1429-30 (9th Cir. 1987) (“An examination of the symmetry of section 33 
makes it apparent that the Govenrment’s interpretation was not the intended construction 
of the statute.”); ICC v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co., 334 F.2d 46, 50 (5th Cir. 1964) 
(“Symmetry . . . suggests a congressional purpose to allow [the construction 
reached] . . . .”); State ex rel. Carson v. Harrison, 16 N.E. 384, 388 (Ind. 1888) (“[T]he term is 
not only etymologically correct, but it renders the several provisions of the constitution . . . 
symmetrical . . . and effectuates the evident intention of its authors.”). 
171 See, e.g., Missouri. v. Andrews, 787 F.2d 270, 289 n.4 (8th Cir. 1986) (Bright, J., 
dissenting) (“This explanation . . . gives the Act internal symmetry and consistency . . . .”); 
Davis v. U.S. Lines Co., 253 F.2d 262, 265 (3d Cir. 1958) (rejecting interpretation of statute 
that would “rob the statute of symmetry and logic”); Bishop v. Sanford, 15 Ga. 1 (1854) 
(noting need “to harmonize [statutory provisions], if it be possible, to . . .  maintain a 
symmetrical system of legislation, if it can be done”); Sasportas v. De La Motta, 31 S.C. Eq. 
38 (S.C. App. Eq. 1858) (“All of these Acts being in pari materia should be construed . . . so 
as to form a symmetrical and rational system.”). 
172 See, e.g., Barstow v. Adams, 2 Day 70 (Conn. 1805) (This “construction . . . is necessary 
to preserve the symmetry and uniformity of the system.”); Comm’r v. Wyman, 49 Mass. 
247 (1844) (“[The law revision commissioners] were occasionally deficient in giving that 
symmetrical form to the laws which would have been desirable . . . .”). 
173 See, e.g., United States v. Shi, 317 F.3d 715, 717 (7th Cir. 2003) (“The prohibition of 
possessing . . . these phony documents is symmetrical with the prohibition of possessing 
and selling illegal drugs  . . . .”). 
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emerged in other areas.174  Such references have become increasingly 
common since the mid-twentieth century, when opinion writers also 
began to articulate the notion that legislatures do not necessarily intend a 
symmetrical statutory scheme.175  Although they reject symmetry, these 
approaches usually involve appeals to coherence, or even 
correspondence in some sense.  Thus, a writer may explain statutory 
asymmetry by reference to the complexity of reality, which makes the 
perception of coherence, or of the correspondence between law and fact, 
a matter of perspective and an activity committed to the legislature.176  
More recently, writers have explained statutory asymmetry simply by 
noting that justifications for legislative action, unlike those for judicial 
action, need not be declared or self-evident.177 
As these examples indicate, here, as in other areas, opinion writers 
have shied away from acknowledging either the active decision-making 
involved in the identification of symmetrical relationships or the active 
decision-making involved in the judicial tasks in the service of which 
that perception occurs.178  Although a few nineteenth-century opinions 
refer to a court’s creation or restoration of symmetrical coherence to the 
                                                          
174 See, e.g., In re H.B. Claflin Co., 52 F. 121, 124 (2d Cir. 1892) (“[T]he court cannot attempt 
to adjust into symmetry the various provisions of a statute . . . .”); see also Monroe v. Pape, 
365 U.S. 167, 248 (1961) (“The legislative process of the post-bellum Congresses . . . was one 
of struggle and compromise . . . This was not an endeavor for achieving legislative patterns 
of analytically satisfying symmetry.”); Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1029 
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[S]tatutory symmetry is preferable but not required.”); Sec. Bank S.S.B. & 
Subsidiaries v. Comm’r, 116 F.3d 302, 305 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[Congress’s] intent was clearly 
to recognize the economic realities of the situation for the taxpayer rather than an abstract 
principle of symmetry.”). 
175 See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
176 See, e.g., Sec. Bank S.S.B. & Subsidiaries, 116 F.3d at 305; Ind. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. 
Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 890 F.2d 1275, 1282 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[T]his would not 
be the first time that Congress has adjusted the competing positions of strong forces with a 
compromise of imperfect symmetry.”); Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 
(“Congress was not obliged to regulate such demonstrations for the sake of 
symmetry. . . .”); In re Permanent Surface Min. Reg. Litig., 653 F.2d 514, 522-23 (D.C. Cir. 
1981) (“From such a process of compromise and adjustment, a symmetrical statute . . . is 
unlikely to emerge.”). 
177 See, e.g., United States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 541 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[A]lthough 
[the] . . . scheme is asymmetrical, Congress is not required to think like a lawyer, and we 
are not empowered to impose on clear statutory language our own notions of symmetry.”); 
Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“Congress was not obliged to regulate 
such demonstrations for the sake of symmetry . . . .”); United States v. Le Boeuf Bros. 
Towing Co., 537 F.2d 149, 152 (5th Cir. 1976) (“[C]ongressional schemes need not seem to 
courts symmetrical [or] consistent . . . to be valid.”). 
178 But see Comm’r. v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299, 304 (1961) (discussed infra note 181). 
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statutory scheme,179 even during that period advocates and judges 
primarily described coherence as present in the scheme before any 
judicial activity took place.  Thus, a court’s role has long been described 
as that of preserving180 the symmetry of the scheme.181  One longstanding 
approach has been to reject a proposed interpretation on the basis that it 
would mar the already existing symmetry of the scheme.182  This posture 
of detachment from the statutory scheme is a variation on the posture of 
legislative deference, but it is not quite the same.  Advocates and opinion 
writers usually refer to attributes of the statutory scheme itself when 
                                                          
179 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Coxe, 4 U.S. 170, 203 (1800) (Yeates, J.) (“The construction I 
have adopted, appears to me to restore perfect symmetry to the whole act, and to preserve 
its due proportions.”); Std. Underground Cable Co. v. Att’y Gen., 19 A. 733 (N.J. Err. & 
App. 1890) (“Under the construction which we give to this law, it will fall symmetrically 
into our system of . . . taxation.”). 
180 See, e.g., The Star, 16 U.S. 78, 92 (1818) (“In considering the section in question as 
merely affirmative, . . . the symmetry of a system apparently built up with great care and 
caution . . . is maintained and enforced.”); United States v. Arishi, 54 F.3d 596, 597 (9th Cir. 
1995) (“[T]he symmetry between Rule 35(b) motions and U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 motions is 
maintained.”); Ochoa v. Employers Nat’l Ins. Co., 724 F.2d 1171, 1176 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing 
precedent that “persuades us to maintain the symmetry of the Act”); Hills v. Comm’r., 691 
F.2d 997, 1006 (11th Cir. 1982) (under the interpretation adopted, “[s]ymmetry is 
preserved.”); Field v. City of Boston, 64 Mass. 65 (1852) (“Thus the symmetry of the law of 
taxation is preserved.”); Macoy v. Curtis, 14 S.C. 367 (1880) (“Such is the meaning of the 
whole provision taken together, and its enforcement is necessary to preserve order and 
symmetry.”). 
181 This tradition is especially pronounced in interpretations of the Internal Revenue 
Code.  See, e.g., United States v. Olympic Radio & Television, 349 U.S. 232, 236 (1955).  “We 
can only take the Code as we find it and give it as great an internal symmetry and 
consistency as its words permit.”  Id.  Interestingly, and contrary to the trends traced 
throughout most of this study, the Court later transformed this rule, which originally 
stressed the court’s passivity, into a command to courts to impose symmetry on the code to 
help it to attain the intended coherence.  See Lester, 366 U.S. at 304.  “[T]he Code must be 
given ‘as great an internal symmetry and consistency as its words permit.’”  Id. (citing 
Olympic Radio & Television, 349 U.S. at 236) (emphasis added). 
182 See, e.g., Hiller Cranberry Prods., Inc. v. Koplovsky, 165 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 1999) 
(Selya, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority . . . disrupts the symmetry of the statutory scheme.”); 
Sharp Microelectronics Tech., Inc. v. United States, 122 F.3d 1446, 1452 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(“We thus can identify a symmetry in the [statute] . . . . We think that symmetry is 
dislodged and its components discounted too much by [the] argument . . . .”); Richey 
Manor, Inc. v. Schweiker, 684 F.2d 130, 135 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (rejecting construction that 
would “destroy the symmetry of the regulatory scheme”); Int’l Org. of Masters, Mates & 
Pilots, Marine Div., Intern Longshore Men’s Ass’n, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 539 F.2d 554, 560 
(5th Cir. 1976) (noting that party’s “argument, if allowed to prevail, would destroy the 
symmetry . . . embodied in [the statute]”); United States v. Klinger, 199 F.2d 645, 646 (2d 
Cir. 1952) (rejecting “alteration in the statutory scheme . . . that destroys its symmetry”); 
Carpenter v. Hoyt, 17 Ill. 529 (1856) (“We should destroy the symmetry, mar the design, 
and defeat the obvious intent of the legislator, in any other interpretation.”); State v. 
Sturgess, 9 Or. 537 (1881) (“[I]t is quite apparent that if the [statute] last enacted should be 
held [to have the meaning proposed], a conflict . . . would be 
developed; . . . symmetry . . . lost, inconsistencies and incompatibilities introduced . . . .”). 
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legislative intention is obscure or off-limits as material for justification.  
In such a situation, the activity and power of a court are potentially at 
their height.  Yet, as described, most references to symmetry function to 
veil this activity and power.  
It is not immediately clear how this rhetoric of detachment applies to 
the context of a court’s common-law role, as it would seem difficult to 
describe the common law as created by anything other than courts.  The 
next section explores legal writers’ responses to this difficulty. 
2. Doctrinal Coherence and the Edifice of the Law 
References to symmetry in descriptions of the coherence of legal 
doctrine have been more complex than references to the concept in 
connection with statutory coherence.  As in the statutory context, legal 
writers have consistently referred to the body of common law and 
constitutional legal doctrine as self-evidently symmetrical, and they have 
also referred to it as justifiably asymmetrical.  But in references to legal 
doctrine as symmetrical, writers have also added another approach:  a 
pervasive figure of speech that first metaphorically transforms the body 
of doctrine into an architectural structure and then attributes 
symmetrical properties to it.  This device permits legal writers to 
maintain the descriptive distance from the courts’ own efforts and the 
disavowal of interference that usually seems to accompany references to 
symmetry in legal writing, while also acknowledging the created nature 
of the law.   
The approach appears as early as the first chapter of Blackstone’s 
Commentaries: 
The mischiefs that have arisen to the public from 
inconsiderate alterations of our laws [through 
legislation], are too obvious to be called in 
question . . . . The common law of England has fared like 
other venerable edifices of antiquity, which rash and 
inexperienced workmen have ventured to new-dress 
and refine, with all the rage of modern improvement.  
Hence frequently its symmetry has been destroyed, its 
proportions distorted, and its majestic simplicity 
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exchanged for specious embellishments and fantastic 
novelties.183 
Many American judges have taken up Blackstone’s image.184  The 
preeminent United States example of the metaphor is probably Justice 
Cardozo’s 1937 statement in Palko v. Connecticut.185  To cap his argument 
that no constitutional guarantees were violated by a state statute 
permitting the retrial for a capital crime of a defendant already convicted 
of a noncapital crime based on the same offense, Justice Cardozo stated 
that the statute did no damage to constitutional doctrine, but rather lent 
reciprocal, or bilateral, symmetry to the law: 
If the trial had been infected with error adverse to the 
accused, there might have been review at his instance, 
and as often as necessary to purge the vicious taint.  A 
reciprocal privilege, subject at all times to the discretion 
of the presiding judge, has now been granted to the 
state.  There is here no seismic innovation.  The edifice of 
justice stands, its symmetry, to many, greater than 
before.186  
Justice Cardozo’s articulation, unlike Blackstone’s, describes 
constitutional doctrine and statutory law as a seamless whole.  It also 
illustrates the trend toward a more concrete conception of bilateral 
symmetry and away from references to lawmaking in terms of activity.  
But Justice Cardozo’s approach echoes Blackstone’s in identifying the 
“edifice of justice” as something basically created by a body other than 
the court deciding the dispute in question.187 
                                                          
183 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1765-69), § 1, ¶14 
(Introduction) (On the Study of Law).  On the significance of Blackstone’s Commentaries to 
American law, see LAWRENCE W. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 59-60, 467-68 
(3d ed. 2005); WOOD, supra note 14, at 10, 264, 350. 
184 For a recent example, see NLRB v. Acme Die Casting Corp., 728 F.2d 959, 963 (7th Cir. 
1984) (Reported cases “do not form an edifice of perfect symmetry.”).  In addition to the 
cases cited infra notes 192, 193, 195, 199, see Den v. Vancleve, 5 N.J.L. 589 (1819) (“[I]f we 
were to take up the decisions of all the states founded as they are upon local customs, 
colonial necessities, and legislative innovations, and . . . make them the rule of adjudication 
here, we should . . . disfigure and break down the ancient temple of justice.”). 
185 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937). 
186 Id. (internal citations omitted).  For a discussion of Cardozo’s approaches to use of the 
concept of symmetry in legal discourse, see Laurence, supra note 90, at 876 n.53, and 
discussion infra note 276. 
187 Palko, 302 U.S. at 328. 
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The power of the edifice metaphor is surely due partly to its 
versatility.  It links a holistic conception of symmetry to an array of 
otherwise unrelated norms:  comprehensiveness, aesthetic harmony, 
tradition, stability, and impersonality, as well as social cohesion, implied 
by the fact that “edifices” can be created only by the organized work of 
many people.  Despite this versatility, around the end of the nineteenth 
century, opinion writers sometimes declined to invoke it in linking 
symmetry to doctrinal coherence.  Instead, they began to link both 
doctrinal coherence and symmetry to a norm that is less easy to 
accommodate within the edifice-of-the-law metaphor—efficiency.188  
Around the same time, and consistently with the development noted 
repeatedly above, opinion writers also began to use the opposition 
between practical reality and theoretical symmetry to justify conclusions 
sustaining or introducing apparent asymmetries, or anomalies, within 
legal doctrine.189  This approach became widespread by the second half 
of the twentieth century.  But like the analogous trends discussed in 
previous sections, it did not involve the rejection of symmetry as a norm, 
as the approach presumes a need to justify apparently asymmetrical 
doctrinal structures.  And alongside this approach, opinion writers have 
continued to align the edifice-of-the-law metaphor and other references 
to symmetry directly with doctrinal coherence.190  Judges and justices 
                                                          
188 See Workman v. City of New York, 179 U.S. 552, 559 (1900) (noting the “evil springing 
from” “[t]he disappearance of all symmetry in the maritime law”); Hardie v. Swafford 
Bros. Dry Goods Co., 165 F. 588, 591 (5th Cir. 1908) (“[W]e are disposed to deny that 
in . . . bankruptcy law the discharge of the honest debtor . . . could have been omitted 
without impairing [the law’s] symmetry and efficiency . . . .”). 
189 See, e.g., Tyler v. Tomkinson, 414 F.2d 844, 847 (5th Cir. 1969) (“[T]his field of the law 
continues to defy symmetry.”); Jordahl v. Berry, 75 N.W. 10 (Minn. 1898) (“[I]t is more 
important to work practical justice than to preserve the logical symmetry of a rule . . . .”).  
Similar usages did preexist the late nineteenth century.  See United States v. Forness, 125 
F.2d 928, 937 n.28 (2d Cir. 1942) (noting Henry Maine’s criticism, in Ancient Law (1861), of 
the notion that “‘somewhere . . . there existed a complete, coherent, symmetrical body of 
English law . . . furnish[ing] principles [applicable] to any . . . combination of 
circumstances’”); Richardson v. Daggett, 4 Vt. 336 (1832) (“[T]here is not in the law on this 
subject, that perfect symmetry . . . which might be desired. The difficulty is probably 
inherent in the subject.”). 
190 See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 344 F.3d 1359, 
1374 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Rader, J., concurring) (“Like the proverbial balloon, a pinch on this 
backside of the law disrupts symmetry on the front side.”); Wigginton v. Centracchio, 205 
F.3d 504, 511 n.9 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting that court’s earlier “broadening of [a principle 
drawn from an earlier case] was required . . . to maintain doctrinal symmetry”); Waddle v. 
Sparks, 414 S.E.2d 22, 27 (N.C. 1992) (“[A]pplying the same standard . . . promotes a 
symmetry desirable in this area of the law.”). 
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sometimes even cite doctrinal symmetry as the sole justification for a 
result, without linking it to any other value.191 
In a related tradition that also first emerged in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, advocates and opinion writers began to refer to 
symmetry in descriptions not of doctrine, but of the judicial system 
considered institutionally.192  This usage sometimes borrowed the edifice 
metaphor and also sometimes, as in Palko, seemed to identify doctrine 
and institution as parts of the same edifice.193  This focus on the holistic 
integrity of the judicial system has now largely given way to linkages of 
institutional symmetry with transjurisdictional correspondence and 
parallelism.194 
As in all of the areas discussed above, when discussing doctrinal 
coherence, opinion writers commonly cast themselves and courts, in a 
passive role.  To be sure, these writers have sometimes acknowledged 
the fact that doctrine is the product of judicial action195 and, less often, 
                                                          
191 Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 638 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(“Without transient jurisdiction, an asymmetry would arise: A transient would have the 
full benefit of the power of the State’s courts as a plaintiff while retaining immunity from 
their authority as a defendant.”). 
192 See Coombs v. State, 47 S.W. 163, 167 (Tex. Crim. App. 1898) (“[U]nique in outline, 
perfect in symmetry, . . . this magnificent temple of justice, builded by the framers of our 
constitution, is well fitted to . . . grapple with all the demands of litigation.”); see also New 
England Mut. Marine Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. 1, 23 (1870) (“The admiralty 
courts . . . deriv[ed] . . . much of [their] completeness and symmetry . . . from the civil 
law.”); In re Wyllie, 2 Hughes 449, 30 F.Cas. 733 (W.D. Va. 1872) (declining invitation to 
“mar the symmetry . . . of that wisely constructed system of courts for administering the 
law of both governments”); Persons v. Hight, 4 Ga. 474 (1848) (Nisbet, J., concurring) 
(“Nothing is more painful to me, than this marring of the beauty of the law—this 
destruction of its symmetry and order . . . .”). 
193 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937).  For other examples in which it is 
difficult to distinguish doctrine from institution, see Commonwealth v. Chapman, 54 Mass. 68 
(1847); Den v. Vancleve, 5 N.J.L. 589 (N.J. 1819), cited supra note 184. 
194 See, e.g., Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 285 (1985) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“In 
achieving statewide symmetry among civil rights claims the Court creates fresh problems 
of asymmetry that are of far greater moment . . . .”); Tipton-Whittingham v. City of Los 
Angeles, 316 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting “symmetry” between California and 
federal antidiscrimination statutes); Shepherd v. Comm’r., 147 F.3d 633, 636 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(Posner, J.) (referring to “the symmetry that we have stressed throughout this opinion 
between the Tax Court in deficiency cases and the district courts in refund cases”); Forsyth 
v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1480 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[T]here is some symmetry between 
RICO’s private right of action and Nevada’s administrative scheme.”); Saffron v. Dep’t of 
the Navy, 561 F.2d 938, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (referring to “the symmetry between the [Court 
of Claims and the district courts] which Congress has endeavored to promote”). 
195 See, e.g., Ex parte Andrews, 40 Ala. 639 (1867) (Byrd, J.) (“The integrity, learning, 
patriotism, and legal and judicial opinions of [Story, Hamilton, Kent, and Marshall] are the 
solid, massive, polished, and enduring pillars, upon which reposes the vast superstructure 
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their own role in its construction.196  But usually they use devices such as 
the edifice metaphor to obscure their agency.  The metaphor most often 
identifies the symmetrical edifice of doctrine as something perfected 
before the adjudicator comes on the scene.  By distinguishing doctrine 
from their own actions in this way, opinion writers easily represent their 
relationship to doctrine as a matter of relatively passive preservation197 
or restoration198 of the symmetry of the edifice.  Thus, opinion writers 
have commonly used the metaphor to justify a refusal to act, on the basis 
that any action would deface the edifice.199  
                                                                                                                                  
of American . . . jurisprudence; and whatever beauty of expression, symmetry of 
proportion, unity of construction, and solidity of texture, are to be found in the splendid 
fabric, may be traced to [their] labors . . . .”); Dehon v. Foster, 86 Mass. 545, 555 (1862) 
(referring to “perfect[ion]” of “‘English equity into a symmetrical science’”); cf. Hughes v. 
Anderson, 68 Ala. 280 (1880) (“The rough outline of natural right, or natural liberty, must 
submit to the chisel of the mason, that it may enter symmetrically into the social 
structure.”); Schall v. Williams Valley R. Co., 35 Pa. 191 (1860) (quoting district court 
opinion referring approvingly to “a symmetrical system of principles and rules, built up by 
the labours of the learned through a series of ages”). 
196 See, e.g., Ward v. Studebaker Sales Corp. of Am., 113 F.2d 567, 569 (3d Cir. 1940) 
(referring to “the difficult effort to preserve juristic symmetry and at the same time not 
disturb stare decisis”). 
197 See, e.g., Brokerage Concepts, Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 140 F.3d 494, 535 (3d Cir. 
1998) (“[T]he need to preserve symmetry between the treatment of general and special 
verdicts would . . . be denigrated, by a finding of waiver . . . .”); Butler v. Local Union 823, 
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers, 514 F.2d 442, 450 (5th Cir. 
1975) (“[T]he rule [proposed] preserves the symmetry . . . necessary to the furtherance of 
federal labor policy . . . .”); Ward v. Studebaker Sales Corp. of Am., 113 F.2d 567, 569 (3d. 
Cir. 1940); Howland v. Doyle, 5 R.I. 33 (1857) (“Except to preserve the symmetry of the 
common-law system, it is . . . of little practical importance whether a warranty . . . be 
implied . . . .”); Joslyn v. Smith, 13 Vt. 353 (1841) (argument of plaintiff) (“This doctrine is 
necessary to preserve the symmetry of the law, (which ought not to be departed from but 
from necessity or by statute).”). 
198 See, e.g., United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e restore 
symmetry and consistency to our law.”); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Calbeck, 293 F.2d 52, 56 (5th 
Cir. 1961) (“[The position taken in previous cases] has more than restored symmetry 
within . . . this Circuit.”); Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549, 553-54 
(Tex. App.), rev’d in part, 696 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1985) (“The time has come to . . . restore 
equity and symmetry to this area of the law . . . .”); cf. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 670 
(1961) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[T]his is an appropriate case in which to put an end to the 
asymmetry which Wolf imported into the law.”). 
199 See, e.g., Reeves v. Petty & Goodner, 44 Tex. 249 (1875) (“When we reflect that those 
who sat in judgment in these cases were men who . . . drew up, gave shape to, and aided in 
the passage of many of our laws, we may not wonder that those of us who 
follow . . . dislike to see the symmetry of the temple defaced or marred.”); see also Peterson 
v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1259 (9th Cir. 1985) (rejecting conclusion that would “destroy 
the rationality and symmetry the Supreme Court has finally brought to the law”); United 
States v. Fleming, 115 F.2d 314, 316 (5th Cir. 1940) (noting that proposed result “encroaches 
on and to that extent impairs, the symmetry of the rule of comparative negligence broadly 
applied”); Haynes v. Nowlin, 29 N.E. 389, 390 (Ind. 1891) (“The decisions which 
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Both the description of doctrinal symmetry as a matter of efficiency 
and references to justified asymmetry commonly accompany a rhetoric 
of judicial passivity.  The focus on efficiency achieves this by stressing 
not court-generated doctrine, but its real-world consequences, and 
implying a norm of minimal activity.  The justified-asymmetry approach 
achieves a similar end by stressing the correspondence of the preferred 
result with the complexity of reality or with intuited, rather than 
theoretical or logically derived, justice. 
Thus, opinion writers’ references to symmetry in articulating the 
roles of courts in shaping doctrine and interpreting statutes do resemble 
the approaches discussed in previous sections.  Regardless of whether 
these writers posit symmetry or asymmetry as components of 
lawmakers’ intent or as features of the law itself, the writers usually 
locate the origin of that symmetry or asymmetry elsewhere than in the 
courts.  Increasingly, in as many ways as possible, opinion writers avoid 
direct acknowledgment of their own role in the attribution of symmetry 
or asymmetry to the problem before them or to the law they create and 
apply.  In the past three decades, opinion writers have developed a new 
rhetorical device for achieving a similar end, addressed in the next 
section.  
D. Correcting for Market Imperfections 
The increasingly popular approaches discussed in this section are 
much more uniform than those discussed in previous sections.  In 
describing the judicial system’s role of correcting for imperfections in 
various markets, opinion writers invariably mobilize a very pure form of 
the bilateral conception of symmetry.   
Although the notion of bilateral reciprocity has clear applicability to 
common-law contract doctrine,200 and although the sense of symmetry to 
mean a specifically bilateral abstract relationship was certainly in wide 
use by the mid-nineteenth century,201 explicit linkages of concepts of 
symmetry and asymmetry with bilateral bargaining and competitive 
                                                                                                                                  
denied . . . a right of action broke the line of consistency and marred the symmetry of the 
law.”). 
200 See, e.g., Pine R. State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629 (Minn. 1983) (“The 
demand for mutuality of obligation, although appealing in its symmetry, is simply a 
species of the forbidden inquiry into the adequacy of consideration . . . .”); Jeffrey L. 
Harrison, A Case for Loss Sharing, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 573, 573 (1983) (“Contract law is 
characterized by a comforting symmetry.”). 
201 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
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relationships are rare before the 1980s.202  (This timing could be taken as 
a sign of the influence on legal reasoning and rhetoric of economic 
analysis, which seem to have begun to draw heavily on the bilateral 
conception of symmetry in the 1950s and ‘60s,203 and the subsequent 
development of law and economics scholarship.204)  The explicit judicial 
references to the concept that began to appear in the 1980s link the 
corrective role played by courts to, among other things, asymmetries in 
risk,205 bargaining power,206 opportunity,207 and information.208   
                                                          
202 Courts have long referred to the “symmetry” of contracts but earlier used the term in 
its holistic sense.  Many early twentieth-century opinions address the severability of 
contract clauses as a question of whether excision of a clause would affect the symmetry of 
the contract as a whole.  The rule using this language may have originated in Newport 
Rolling Hill Co. v. Hall, 144 S.W. 760 (Ky. App. 1912): “The general rule is that where 
obnoxious feature of a contract can be avoided without impairing its symmetry as a whole, 
the courts will be most likely to adopt this view . . . .”  Id. at 762-63.  An unusual early 
opinion connecting symmetry to bilaterality in the contract context is Harris v. Indep. Gas 
Co., 92 P. 1123 (Kan. 1907): “[A] system which attempts . . . to insure to [a contracting party] 
the actual fruits of his bargain, ought, for the sake of completeness and symmetry, to enable 
him to insist upon the performance even of a purely executory contract.”  Id. at 1124.  One 
early reference to symmetry to describe the relative power of parties to a bargain is really 
an instance of the precise-correspondence sense of symmetry.  See S.D. Warren Co. v. 
NLRB, 353 F.2d 494, 500 (1st Cir. 1965) (referring to need to a void result that might “mar 
the symmetry of plant-wide [collective] bargaining”).  In a similar early example, the 
Fourth Circuit noted, “While symmetry of application and predictability . . . are 
[important], . . . [w]hat is symmetrical is a complex question. . . . [T]he search for symmetry 
here is rendered even less manageable by the complex exchange relationship created by 
these contracts.”  Bear Brands Hosiery Co. v. Tights, Inc., 605 F.2d 723, 726-27 (4th Cir. 
1979). 
203 See supra note 89. 
204 Cf. Eric M. Fink, Post-Realism, or the Jurisprudential Logic of Late Capitalism: A Socio-Legal 
Analysis of the Rise and Diffusion of Law and Economics, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 931, 951-63 (2004) 
(concluding that diffusion of the law and economics approach into judicial decision-
making has been mild, based on analysis of frequency of citation to law and economics 
scholarship in judicial opinions); Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An 
Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 
152 U. PA. L. REV. 129 (2003) (discussing “deep capture” of legal and political discourse by 
economic modes of thought). 
205 See, e.g., Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 948 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting “asymmetry of 
control of risk-reduction measures between health-care workers and patients”); Jason’s 
Foods, Inc. v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 774 F.2d 214, 218 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J.) (noting 
“argument for regarding the parties’ positions as symmetrical from the standpoint of 
ability either to prevent or to shift losses”). 
206 See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 118 (Cal. 
2000) (discussed supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text); Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 
F.3d 1041, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Wald, J., dissenting) (“Under our rule, the symmetry and 
mutuality of the bargaining process are preserved.”). 
207 See, e.g., Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 827 (1996) (“[P]ermit[ting an] absent 
party to pursue [certain remedies] . . . prevent[s] him from exploiting the asymmetries he 
creates by participating in one suit but not the other.”); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 
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These references share many features.  Virtually all imply that an 
asymmetry of any of these types is inherently undesirable and self-
evidently calls for correction.  The opposition between practical reality 
and theoretical symmetry, noted in most of the areas discussed above, is 
thus rare in this context.209  Identifications of market asymmetry also 
present the correction of such asymmetries as the obviously proper task 
of the legal system.  But almost as often as they assign this task to the 
courts, as in Armendariz,210 opinion writers assign the corrective role to 
other institutions—legislatures211 or administrative agencies and 
executive officers.212  Even when a writer acknowledges the courts’ active 
role in resolving a dispute, the writer can also present the opinion’s 
effects as merely the modest restoration of a natural balance by making 
the correction of market asymmetries the justification for a conclusion.213  
                                                                                                                                  
764 (1981) (“The disparity between the adversaries’ litigation resources is matched by a 
striking asymmetry in their litigation options.”). 
208 Examples of this usage are especially numerous.  Recent instances include, e.g., AT&T 
Commc’ns. of Cal., Inc. v. Pac. Bell Tel. Co., 375 F.3d 894, 908 (9th Cir. 2004) (justifying 
conclusion in part by reference to local telephone providers’ “asymmetric access to cost 
data”); and Nat’l Commc’ns Ass’n Inc. v. AT & T Corp., 238 F.3d 124, 130-31 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(“[I]n applying a similar burden shift to other sections of the Act, the FCC has considered 
information asymmetry.”). 
209 But see Pabst Brewing Co., Inc. v. Corrao, 161 F.3d 434, 443 (7th Cir. 1998) (Ripple, J., 
dissenting) (“Labor contracts . . . rarely reflect the pristine symmetry of the textbook 
contract.”). 
210 See supra Section IV.A.5; see, e.g., Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 827 (1996) 
(discussing how “permit[ting an] absent party to pursue [certain remedies] . . . prevent[s] 
him from exploiting the asymmetries he creates by participating in one suit but not the 
other”); Gracyalny v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 723 F.2d 1311, 1319 n.14 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(“As a result of this asymmetry of information, some courts have imposed upon 
manufacturers a continuing duty to warn of defects . . . .”); Armendariz v. Foundation 
Health Psychcare Servs., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 118 (Cal. 2000) (linking asymmetry in contractual 
clauses and bargaining power to contract law doctrine of unconscionability). 
211 See, e.g., Cornist v. B.J.T. Auto Sales, Inc., 272 F.3d 322, 330 n.4 (6th Cir. 2001) (rejecting 
interpretation of Truth in Lending Act that would result in “credit customers [being] 
asymmetrically advantaged in bargaining over price”); Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 
1041, 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Wald, J., dissenting) (referring to “the symmetry, mutuality, 
and balance of the collective bargaining process as crafted by Congress over the past 60 
years”); Ruefenacht v. O’Halloran, 737 F.2d 320, 336 (3d Cir. 1984) (discussing “state law 
that did not . . . admit of asymmetries between buyer and seller”). 
212 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 208; see also Davin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 60 F.3d 1043, 
1050 (3d Cir. 1995) (same); McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1241 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(same); Alliance for Cmty. Media v. FCC, 10 F.3d 812, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (stating that 
regulation “presented some symmetry between PEG access, leased access, and commercial 
channels”); King v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 830 F.2d 210, 218 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“Affidavits 
submitted by a governmental agency . . . must . . . strive to correct . . . the asymmetrical 
distribution of knowledge that characterizes FOIA litigation.”). 
213 Cf. E.E.O.C. v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529, 1543 n.1 (2d Cir. 1996) (Jacobs, J., 
dissenting) (noting that “the delicate contractual balances created by sophisticated financial 
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Contributing to this effect is the exclusive reliance of this approach 
on the bilateral conception of symmetry.  As noted above, this schema 
implies a modicum of analysis and is also virtually always presented as 
involving comprehensive assessment of all possibilities.214  Because of 
the salience of this schema and our apparent tendency to perceive it as 
natural, references to it almost never involve acknowledgment of the 
contingency of perceptions of symmetry, making it the ideal vehicle for a 
rhetoric of passivity.  
In this area, too, references to symmetry function to obscure judicial 
activity.  The same is largely true of the approaches discussed in the next 
section. 
E. Justifying Conclusions 
This survey concludes by examining the ambivalent uses legal 
writers have made of the concept of symmetry in relation to the reasoned 
justification of legal conclusions.  It is in this area that judicial opinion 
writers most self-consciously address the work they perform.215  But in 
this context, as in those discussed above, these writers have tended to 
use the concept of symmetry as a kind of shorthand.  Even when they 
come closest to discussing the activity they are performing, they 
generally avoid addressing it directly or describing it as activity.  
1. Symmetry and Logic  
United States opinion writers have consistently drawn both positive 
and negative connections between symmetry and logic.  Most of the 
positive approaches fall into two overlapping categories.  In the first, 
writers simply link logic and symmetry grammatically.  In the second, 
these opinion writers, like some of the commentators discussed in Part 
III, use the concept of symmetry as an organizational and reasoning tool, 
an indicator of the route to a sound conclusion.   
                                                                                                                                  
professionals [can] become distorted by . . . asymmetries, and unsettled expectations”); 
Cajun Elec. Power Co-op., Inc. v. FERC, 28 F.3d 173, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (reversing decision 
on ground that result “creates an odd asymmetry” in market power). 
214 See discussion supra notes 21, 62-70 and accompanying text. 
215 Although legal rhetoric is the public manifestation of legal reasoning, the cognitive 
process by which judges arrive at their conclusions should be distinguished from the 
process of reasoned presentation of conclusions.  See Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial 
Decision Making, supra note 55; Wetlaufer, supra note 2.  But see Wald, supra note 2, at 1375 
(“It is not so unusual [for a judge writing an opinion] to modulate, transfer, or even switch 
an originally intended rationale or result in midstream because ‘it just won’t write.’”). 
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One form of the first approach, particularly prevalent in, but not 
restricted to, the nineteenth century involves the assertion of identity 
between “logic” or “reason” and symmetry.216  Another variant makes 
the concepts into attributes of one another by appealing to “logical 
symmetry.”217  This approach presents symmetry as a feature of logic 
and vice versa.  Judge Cardozo’s discussion of “the method of analogy” 
in the first of his lectures in The Nature of the Judicial Process blends these 
approaches; he uses the terms “logic” and “symmetry,” as well as 
“analogy,” as synonyms for consistency and noncontradiction.218  Earlier 
approaches had implied an aesthetic approach to logic, appealing to a 
sense of symmetry somewhere between that of holistic coherence and 
that of regular correspondence.  Cardozo’s equation of symmetry and 
analogy draws more directly on the conception of symmetry as precise 
correspondence.219 
The organizational use of the concept of symmetry in connection 
with logic takes a number of forms.  In one longstanding variant still 
used today, symmetry in any one of its senses may be presented as one 
                                                          
216 See, e.g., Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373, 378 (1960) 
(“[T]here is symmetry and logic in the design of § 24.”); Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 
U.S. 304, 313 (1945) (“Statutes of limitations always have vexed the philosophical mind for 
it is difficult to fit them into a completely logical and symmetrical system of law.”); Bressler 
v. Fortune Magazine, 971 F.2d 1226, 1240 (6th Cir. 1992) (“[D]efendants’ argument has 
more than merely a logical or symmetrical appeal.”); Black v. Black, 34 Pa. 354 (1859) (“[A] 
proper plea, presenting that issue, would have been more consistent with legal symmetry 
and logic.”); Hill v. Sanders, 38 S.C.L. 521 (S.C. App. 1851) (rejecting position as “calculated 
to deform instead of maintaining the symmetry and beauty of the law as a system of reason 
and logic”). 
217 Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Wilkey, J., dissenting) 
(“There is a logical symmetry in this principle.”); NLRB v. Annapolis Emer. Hosp. Ass’n, 
Inc., 561 F.2d 524, 533 (4th Cir. 1977) (“[T]he Board has no authority, even in the service of 
logical symmetry, to deny a place on the ballot to a petitioner . . . .”); Am. Metal Cap Co. v. 
Anchor Cap & Closure Corp., 20 F.2d 725, 727 (2d Cir. 1927) (characterizing position as 
“important, at least theoretically, for its logical symmetry”); Adams v. Way, 32 Conn. 160 
(1864) (“Any other course would mar the logical symmetry of common law pleadings.”). 
218 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921). 
219 Cardozo states, for instance: “[T]he judge must . . . extract from the precedents the 
underlying principle[,] . . . then determine the path . . . along which [it] is to move and 
develop. . . . The social interest served by symmetry or certainty must . . . be balanced 
against the social interest served by equity and fairness or other elements of social 
welfare.”  Id. at 112-13.  This quotation hints at Cardozo’s ambivalent attitude toward the 
normative value of symmetry when linked with logic.  See Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 230 
N.Y. 239, 242-43 (1921) (“Those who think more of symmetry and logic in the development 
of legal rules than of practical adaptation to the attainment of a just result will be troubled 
by a [rule such as that announced]. . . .”); see also infra note 276. 
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justification among others for a conclusion.220  Although this approach 
usually does not treat symmetry as a stand-alone justification, opinion 
writers have on occasion referred to the symmetry of a conclusion as 
“compelling” 221 or “requiring”222 that conclusion.  Some such references 
attribute holistic symmetry to self-evident generalizations embracing 
particular conclusions.223  Others attribute precise correspondence to the 
inductive extrapolation of conclusions from regular and recurring 
scenarios.224   
Still another approach refers to the concept of symmetry to generate 
objections to be refuted.  This approach involves an assertion that while 
symmetry, in the sense of either reflection or correspondence, suggests a 
certain conclusion, that conclusion is incorrect.225  A final approach uses 
the concept of symmetry to generate the starting point or next step in a 
process of reasoning or systematic description.226  This approach seems 
                                                          
220 See, e.g., McCarthy v. Azure, 22 F.3d 351, 361 (1st Cir. 1994) (“Perhaps most 
important . . . adopting appellant’s proposal would introduce a troubling asymmetry into 
the law . . . .”); De Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 795 (2d Cir. 1984) (“Our 
disagreement with the finding . . . rests on more than the resulting lack of symmetry in 
application of the [statute].”); In re Continental Inv. Corp., 637 F.2d 1, 7 n.11 (1st Cir. 1980) 
(“[T]his asymmetry further supports the proposition advanced above . . . .”); GAF Corp. v. 
Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 719 (2d Cir. 1971) (“There are compelling reasons in addition to 
preserving symmetry which mandate that GAF has standing.”). 
221 Richmond Black Police Officers Ass’n v. City of Richmond, Va., 548 F.2d 123, 129 (4th 
Cir. 1977) (“[S]ymmetry in legal logic compels our holding . . . .”). 
222 See Chapron v. Cassaday, 22 Tenn. 661 (1842) (“[T]he symmetry of the law requires 
that we . . . hold the doctrine laid down by [precedent].”); Irish v. Clayes, 10 Vt. 81 (1838) 
(“By perfect parity of reasoning, by analogy of principle, by every rule of consistency and 
symmetry, it must be held that . . . the law . . . restored the other party to his . . . rights.”). 
223 See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH, supra note 36, at 380-82, 398-400 
(describing deduction as container-based reasoning); Winter, supra note 36, at 223-58 
(addressing analogical reasoning as category extension). 
224 Cf. Keith Stenning & Padraic Monaghan, Strategies and Knowledge Representation, in 
THE NATURE OF REASONING, supra note 40, at 129 (addressing social function of 
enthymemes in establishing consensus). 
225 See, e.g., Montgomery v. Aetna Plywood, Inc., 231 F.3d 399, 412 n.5 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(“While the lack of symmetry between the treatment of cases filed in state court and federal 
court may appear to be incongruous, it is justified . . . .”); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. 
SEC, 873 F.2d 325, 331-32 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“We recognize that the . . . rule produces 
asymmetrical results . . . . That asymmetry derives, however, from the . . . test [on] which 
the question [depends].”); United States v. Milby, 400 F.2d 702, 708 (6th Cir. 1968) 
(“[A]lthough the argument has the virtue of a certain symmetry . . . Congress chose to write 
the statute otherwise.”); Simons v. Bryce, 10 S.C. 354 (1878) (“It may be insisted . . . that as 
in the one case a mortgage must still be regarded as an alienation, that it ought also to be so 
considered in the other . . . [to] preserv[e] the symmetry of the law. . . . [W]e are unable to 
see by what authority a Court can abrogate a statute . . . even for . . . so desirable an end.”). 
226 See Bear Brand Hosiery Co. v. Tights, Inc., 605 F.2d 723, 726 (4th Cir. 1979) (“While 
symmetry of application and the predictability of attempts to strike fair . . . bargains are 
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first to have appeared around the end of the nineteenth century; Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr., used something similar to structure his analysis of 
doctrine concerning the succession of rights in land in The Common 
Law.227  This variation sometimes draws on the holistic conception of 
symmetry, in which case the direction of reasoning is governed by the 
court’s asserted grasp of the overall structure of the issue.228  Sometimes, 
however, this variation draws on the bilateral conception, in which case 
the next step in reasoning is generated by considering the contrary of a 
proposition that has already been addressed.229 
All of these uses recognize a place for symmetry in legal justification, 
but the reasons for this role are never stated.  Instead, legal writers cite 
symmetry as a self-evidently valuable component of an orderly 
reasoning process.  Of course opinion writers are not obliged to explain 
every aspect of the reasons they provide for particular conclusions.  And 
with a few exceptions, symmetry is rarely the linchpin of a justification.  
But it remains remarkable how little analytic attention this clearly 
functional concept has received.  This neglect becomes more perplexing 
in light of the uses discussed next. 
2. Symmetry as a Threat to Reason  
The notion of symmetry as a threat to sound decision-making is 
closely related to the notion of justified asymmetry, but the approaches 
discussed here use stronger language than do most references to justified 
asymmetry, and they move further toward categorical rejection of 
symmetry as a useful concept.  References to symmetry as a threat 
oppose the concept to the practical reality with which the law is properly 
                                                                                                                                  
lights along the way in the search for contractual intent, our purpose is far more 
circumscribed here.”); see also Am. Rivers v. FERC, 187 F.3d 1007, 1026 (9th Cir. 1999) (“We 
thus turn to the merits . . . . We begin with the critical asymmetry in sections 18 and 10(j).”); 
Abbs v. Sullivan, 963 F.2d 918, 927 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[H]e will be no worse off than he would 
have been had he never brought the present suit, assuming (for symmetry) that this suit 
terminated adversely to him on the merits.”); ICC v. B&T Transp. Co., 613 F.2d 1182, 1186 
n.6 (1st Cir. 1980) (“[S]ymmetry suggests allowing a court, in the exercise of full equitable 
powers under DeMario, the same scope . . . .”); ICC v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co., 334 F.2d 46, 50 
(5th Cir. 1964) (“Symmetry also suggests a congressional purpose to allow review of an 
award-order . . . .”). 
227 See HOLMES, supra note 123, at 381.  “[A]lthough it would be more symmetrical if this 
analysis exhausted the subject, there is another class of cases in which the transfer of rights 
takes place upon a wholly different plan.” 
228 See, e.g., Bear Brand Hosiery Co., 605 F.2d at 726; ICC, 613 F.2d at 1186 n.6; HOLMES, 
supra note 123, at 381. 
229 See, e.g., Abbs v. Sullivan, 963 F.2d 918, 927 (7th Cir. 1992); ICC, 334 F.2d at 50. 
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concerned, link the concept to other negative norms, and seem to deny 
that symmetry may ever be a guide to a correct or justified conclusion. 
Such uses extend well back into United States legal history, 
predating most references to justified asymmetry.  In some cases, 
however, the two approaches overlap.  In the Federalist No. 37, for 
instance, Madison suggested that only “a Constitution [planned] in [a] 
closet or in . . . imagination” would possess “artificial structure and 
regular symmetry.”230  Even stronger dismissal of the concept was 
common in the nineteenth century:  advocates and opinion writers 
during this period identified symmetry, used as a guide for justification 
or a reason in support of a conclusion, as “unsubstantial,”231 
“imagined,”232 a “fancied”233 temptation to be resisted,234 the object of an 
irrational “blind love,”235 the source of only temporary gratification,236 a 
source of distortion,237 “hazardous,”238 and confusing.239  Rejections of 
arguments based on “mere” symmetry240 span both nineteenth- and 
                                                          
230 THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
231 Seymour’s Adm’r v. Beach, 4 Vt. 493 (1831) (“To restore symmetry in the 
law . . . would be [a] benefit[ ] too . . . unsubstantial to justify . . . disturbing the settled 
law. . . .”). 
232 Moore v. Paul, 28 S.C. Eq. 358, 1855 WL 3164 (S.C. App. Eq. Jan. 1855) (per curiam). 
233 McCree v. Houston, 7 N.C. 429 (1819) (argument for defendant) (“[M]en should make 
laws to meet actual . . . mischiefs, and not to accommodate their acts to the fancied 
symmetry of the theorist.”). 
234 Hamilton v. People, 29 Mich. 173 (1874) (“[P]rofessional persons are under a constant 
temptation to make the law symmetrical by disregarding small things.”). 
235 Tompkins v. Hollister, 27 N.W. 651, 656 (Mich. 1886) (citing STORY, supra note 161); 
Sparks v. Pittman, 51 Miss. 511 (1875) (same). 
236 Golson v. Dunlap, 73 Cal. 157, 16,214 P. 576, 578 (1887).  “A fixed standard might 
gratify a love of symmetry and be easy of application, but would not further the ends of 
justice.”  Id. 
237 In his Commentaries on the Constitution, Joseph Story noted: 
Men of ingenious and subtle minds, who seek for symmetry and 
harmony in language, having found in the constitution a word used in 
some sense, which falls in with their favorite theory of interpreting it, 
have made that the standard, by which to measure its use in every 
other part of the instrument. They have thus stretched it, as it were, on 
the bed of Procrustes, lopping off its meaning, when it seemed too 
large for their purposes, and extending it, when it seemed too short. 
STORY, supra note 161, § 454; see also State v. Shaw, 9 S.C. 94 (1878) (quoting this passage). 
238 Painter v. Pasadena Land & Water Co., 91 Cal. 74, 84-85 (1891). 
239 Hall v. City of Ionia, 38 Mich. 493 (1878) (“Some confusion has . . . been caused by an 
attempt among writers to create symmetry in the law by putting all rights connected with 
land . . . into classes . . . .”). 
240 See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 216 (1960) (“Mere logical symmetry and 
abstract reasoning are . . . not enough . . . to support [the proposed] doctrine . . . .”); State v. 
McDonnell, 32 Vt. 491 (1860) (“[A]n exceptional rule . . . likely to be characterized as an 
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twentieth-century legal writing.  Opinion writers have been emphatically 
dismissive:  judicial opinions have called symmetry superficial,241 a 
matter of nit-picking “niceties,”242 an “academic desire,”243 “a sort of 
legal scholasticism,”244 an “unrealistic” goal seriously entertained by “no 
one in his right mind,”245 “misleading,”246 “illusory,”247 a “deceptive” 248 
and “seductive”249 “lure,”250 attractive only to the naïve,251 a quixotic 
goal,252 “purposeless,”253 “sterile,”254 “inappropriate,”255 irrelevant,256 and 
spurious.257 
                                                                                                                                  
absurdity by the mere advocates of logical symmetry in the law, will nevertheless be sure, 
in the long run, to constantly gain ground . . . .”). 
241 Sullivan v. CIA, 992 F.2d 1249, 1253 (1st Cir. 1993) (“[E]quating the two might produce 
a certain superficial symmetry, [but] doing so flies in the teeth of history.”); Claudio v. 
Scully, 982 F.2d 798, 811-12 (2d Cir. 1992) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“The superficial 
symmetry of this argument ignores the nature of the appellate function.”); Potomac Elec. 
Power Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp., 606 F.2d 1324, 1328 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“The 
apparent symmetry achieved by this argument is only superficially pleasing . . . .”); Gen. 
Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 657 (2d Cir. 1974) (Mansfield, J., 
concurring) (“[S]uch a . . . doctrine . . . may have surface appeal to those dedicated to sheer 
symmetry . . . .”). 
242 United States v. F.&M. Schaefer Brewing Co., 356 U.S. 227, 249 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he problem before us concerns not the niceties of abstract logic or legal 
symmetry, but the practicalities of litigation and judicial administration in the federal 
courts  . . . .”). 
243 CIR v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 290 (1960) (referring to “academic desire 
for . . . symmetry”). 
244 Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 214 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Tamm, J., dissenting) 
(disparaging majority opinion as “self-justifying . . . adroit intellectual symmetry—a sort of 
legal scholasticism”). 
245 United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483, 487 (5th Cir. 1964) (Tuttle, J., 
dissenting) (“[N]o one in his right mind is unrealistic enough to suppose that the law is 
always a perfect symmetry, never involves contradictions, always avoids conflicts.”). 
246 Kemp v. Beasley, 389 F.2d 178, 190 (8th Cir. 1968). 
247 United States v. Wexler, 31 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he apparent symmetry is 
illusory . . . .”). 
248 Inland Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 562, 564 (7th Cir. 1971). 
249 United States v. Chaidez, 919 F.2d 1193, 1203 (7th Cir. 1990) (Ripple, J., dissenting). 
250 Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 324 (1955); cf. Scripps-
Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 19 (1942) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“[T]o seize on that 
lack of symmetry here is to miss the forest for the trees.”). 
251 Exacto Spring Corp. v. CIR, 196 F.3d 833, 835 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J.) (“One would 
have to be awfully naive to believe that the seven-factor test generated this pleasing 
symmetry.”). 
252 Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 161, 188-89 (1976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(denouncing approach that gives “every evidence of pursuing a quest for what it seems to 
regard as a desirable or necessary symmetry and, in my view, and most unfortunately, 
indulg[ing] in a faulty analysis of the Code’s structure”). 
253 Mitchell v. Scheepvaart Maatschappij Trans-Ocean, 579 F.2d 1274, 1282 (5th Cir. 1978). 
254 Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO, 633 F.2d 
302, 307 (3d Cir. 1980). 
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Justice Stevens’s 2004 dissent in Dretke v. Haley is a good recent 
example of this approach and illustrates both its strength and its 
pitfalls.258  The majority in Haley refused to articulate a new actual-
innocence exception to the rule of procedural default in habeas corpus 
doctrine, even though this seemed to result in great injustice to the 
petitioner.259  Justice Stevens opened his dissent with the following 
criticism of the majority’s conclusion:  “The unending search for 
symmetry in the law can cause judges to forget about justice.  This 
should be a simple case.”260  He thus expressly characterized the 
majority’s conclusion as stemming from a drive toward symmetry and as 
a deliberate departure from the achievement of justice in the case.  
Moreover, Justice Stevens implied that the majority must have actively 
chosen not to resolve Haley’s petition as justice clearly indicated it 
should be resolved:  “This should be a simple case.”261  This statement 
aligns the majority’s pursuit of holistic doctrinal symmetry with a 
conscious choice to act incorrectly or at least benightedly.  Of course, in 
making this statement, Justice Stevens attributed an active role to that 
wing of the Court from which he was distinguishing his own position.  
The outcome Justice Stevens advocated is, in contrast, implicitly so 
obviously correct as to require virtually no conscious decision-making to 
discern.  In this way, Justice Stevens’s critique, like the long tradition of 
similar critiques cited in this section, ultimately functions just like the 
positive appeals to symmetry that it ostensibly rejects.262 
Such negative references to symmetry are also problematic in 
another way.  Previous sections have shown how the perception of 
symmetry in the problems faced by courts has been as much a constant 
in opinion writers’ understandings of their own roles as denial of the 
writers’ agency.  The very pervasiveness of the concept suggests that it 
serves a useful purpose, but rhetoric like Justice Stevens’s denies that 
                                                                                                                                  
255 Pinkney v. Keane, 920 F.2d 1090, 1094 (2d Cir. 1990). 
256 See Rosmer v. Pfizer Inc., 263 F.3d 110, 119 (4th Cir. 2001) (“Notwithstanding the 
symmetrical satisfaction of leaving federal law to federal courts and state law to state 
courts, we cannot read § 1367 [as urged] . . . .”); United States v. Branch, 91 F.3d 699, 714 
(5th Cir. 1996) (“Our issue is error, not symmetry.”). 
257 EEOC v. Pipefitters Ass’n Local Union 597, 334 F.3d 656, 659 (7th Cir. 2003). 
258 541 U.S. 386, 396 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
259 All parties conceded that the petitioner was actually innocent of the convicted crime.  
Id. at 397.  The majority’s conclusion was that actual innocence should not be recognized as 
an exception.  Id. 
260 Id. at 396. 
261 Id. 
262 In this, Justice Stevens’s opinion also conforms to the standard rhetoric of judicial 
dissents, which often cast the accompanying majority opinion as activist.  See Chemerinsky, 
supra note 2, at 2010, 2019-21. 
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conclusion.  The next section explores some of the purposes the concept 
may have served in the past and can serve now. 
V.  IMPLICATIONS 
A topical survey was the clearest way to present the full scope of the 
patterns in courts’ references to symmetry and to show how closely these 
references are linked to courts’ self-description of their own functions.  
But this survey also noted numerous historical shifts in these references.  
For further clarification, this Part first chronologically recapitulates 
highlights of the survey above.  The review draws out both the 
consistencies and the developments in legal writers’ reliances on the 
concept.  
This discussion next identifies two cautionary aspects of the patterns 
described.  First, as noted repeatedly above, legal writers have 
consistently used the concepts of symmetry and asymmetry to describe 
the judicial function as predominantly passive.  This consistency is a 
symptom of a more widespread conceptual and rhetorical pattern that 
identifies courts as basically passive institutions.  This pattern is in turn 
one aspect of an ongoing vulnerability in the legal system’s self-
description of its function.  Second, the unreflective reliance on 
conceptions of symmetry to structure or drive legal thought and writing 
contributes incrementally to entrenchment of this pattern, helping to 
make perception of the weakness more difficult.  At the same time, a 
closer look at the function of the conceptions of symmetry in legal 
rhetoric suggests ways of using those conceptions to structure and 
articulate legal analysis in more self-consciously constructive ways. 
A. Historical Trends in Conceptions of Symmetry  
The earliest use of the concept of symmetry in legal rhetoric 
discussed above is Blackstone’s use of the edifice metaphor to describe 
the English common law in the 1760s.263  Blackstone’s reference to 
holistic symmetry distances the edifice and the law from present-day 
judicial action.  American adoption of this metaphor by advocates, and 
especially by judges, served a function similar to American reliance on 
Blackstone more generally.  By characterizing their undertakings as a 
matter of appreciation rather than construction, American judges and 
lawyers could also present their activity as part of a coherent national 
legal tradition, even where no such thing clearly existed yet.264  During 
                                                          
263 See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
264 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 183, at 59-60, 467-68. 
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this period, lawyers and judges worked in an institutional context 
characterized by dispersion and disconnection and in an intellectual 
culture stressing synthesis and universalism.265  These factors combined 
to make the edifice metaphor and the holistic sense of symmetry—
apparently the primary sense in general use at the time—attractive 
conceptual models of the judicial function.266 
In the mid-nineteenth century, legal writers also began to use the 
concept of symmetry in the sense of precise correspondence.  One way of 
understanding the increased use of this conception in the legal context is 
in relation to the trend toward legal formalism and a new culture-wide 
emphasis on expert inquiry in the second half of the century.267  As 
experts in other institutions—including legislatures, government 
agencies, corporations, universities, and other organizations268—began to 
take on the functions of coordinating activity and resolving conflicts, 
legal writers increasingly focused on assertions of their own expertise 
and institutional autonomy.269  Given its mathematical and scientific 
origins and its connotations of regularity and predictability, the sense of 
symmetry as correspondence would have been clearly useful in this 
regard.270  And as translational symmetries proliferated in the everyday 
lives of Americans, this schema would have come more and more 
readily to mind.271  
                                                          
265 See, e.g., id., at 226-49; WOOD, supra note 14, at 29, 58-59, 261 (discussing holism and 
organicism of eighteenth-century political science and legal theory). 
266 Thus, throughout this period, when courts do not refer to the law as an edifice, they 
tend to refer to it as a seamless web.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Chapman, 54 Mass. 68 
(1847) (“[W]ithout the common law, our legislation and jurisprudence would be impotent, 
and wholly deficient in completeness and symmetry, as a system of municipal law.”); Lyle 
v. Richards, 1823 WL 2183, 9 Serg. & Rawle 322 (Pa. 1823) (noting that rule against 
contingent remainders “filled up the vacuum, and preserved the symmetry, by converting 
the tenant for life into a trustee to support the remainders”). 
267 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 183, passim; GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 
41-67 (1977); HORWITZ, supra note 150, passim. 
268 See DOUGLAS, supra note 73, at 47-48, 111-12 (discussing ANDREW SCHOTTER, THE 
ECONOMIC THEORY OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS (1981)); FRIEDMAN, supra note 183, passim. 
269 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 183, at 340-46, 463-500; THOMAS J. SCHLERETH, VICTORIAN 
AMERICA: TRANSFORMATIONS IN EVERYDAY LIFE, 1876-1915, at 249-53 (1991). 
270 See supra notes 150-53, 216-217 and accompanying text.  In addition to using the 
concept of symmetry to assert their institutional distinctiveness, courts used the concept to 
characterize the functions performed by their new lawmaking competitors, legislatures.  
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 183, at 260-72; HORWITZ, supra note 150, at 259.  Thus, in the early 
nineteenth century, courts begin to attribute to legislatures holistic symmetric purposes.  
See supra note 156 and accompanying text.  Later, they begin to describe statutes as logically 
consistent and therefore symmetrical.  See supra notes 171, 173 and accompanying text. 
271 See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text. 
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In the late nineteenth century, the emphasis on expertise became 
stronger and more compromised.272  A focus on expertise usually will 
focus on parts more than on wholes, and this emphasis makes full 
acknowledgment of context difficult.  The intellectual life of this period 
is marked by discomfort with the growing difficulty of fitting highly 
specialized human creations—technological, intellectual, institutional—
into a cohesive lived experience.  Descriptions of this difficulty and 
efforts to overcome it are characteristic of the period both within and 
outside the law.273  Continued references to symmetry in the holistic 
sense, and to holism generally, were one response.  Legal and opinion 
writers also responded in other ways:  by preferring particularized, 
context-dependent, “practical” justice to symmetrical theory and by 
asserting that theoretical asymmetry might be unavoidable.274 
Into the twentieth century, this discomfort has continued to generate 
conceptual pluralism and critical reflection, as well as a sustained 
impetus toward denial of the created aspects of the law.  Legal and 
opinion writers have continued to invoke holistic symmetry and to refer 
positively to symmetry in the sense of precise correspondence.  But the 
early twentieth century also saw the first notable references to bilateral 
symmetry in connection with the functions of courts.275  From that 
period, legal writers, and especially opinion writers, have drawn on not 
two, but three, different conceptions of symmetry in articulating the 
function of courts.276  
                                                          
272 See HORWITZ, supra note 150, passim. 
273 See, e.g., id. at 194-95; Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 
787 (1989). 
274 See supra notes 120-24, 174-75 and accompanying text.  In line with the increasing 
stress on the concrete, this period also sees a shift toward references to the judicial system 
itself, and not simply justice or doctrine, as the edifice of the law.  See supra notes 192-94 
and accompanying text. 
275 See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 
138, 144 (1914).  Morton Horwitz has contended that the practice of interest balancing as a 
mode of legal analysis also first appeared in the first few decades of the twentieth century, 
although he presents this emergence as a reaction to formalism, not in terms of the 
emergence of bilateral symmetry as a conceptual model.  See HORWITZ, supra note 150, at 
18, 131; cf. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 
943, 948-49 (1987) (contending that the practice first emerged in constitutional adjudication 
in the 1930s and 1940s). 
276 Judge (and then) Justice Cardozo’s varying attitudes toward all three conceptions of 
symmetry illustrate the confusion implicit in this proliferation.  Robert Laurence notes that 
many of Cardozo’s early opinions were critical of the concept.  See Laurence, supra note 90, 
at 876 n.53. But in The Nature of the Judicial Process, published during his time on the New 
York bench, Judge Cardozo equated the legitimate decision-making principle of analogy 
with reason and symmetry.  See supra note 218.  To be sure, he qualified his endorsement of 
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Despite this pluralism, recent legal rhetoric is pervaded above all by 
references to bilateral symmetry.  This sense of symmetry is both potent 
and problematic because of its flexibility and apparent naturalness.  
Bilateral symmetry embodies aspects of both of the other conceptions of 
symmetry used in legal rhetoric.  Bilateral analysis proposes a 
relationship of precise correspondence between the relevant aspects of 
its paired components and holistically implies that no analysis is needed 
beyond the identification of a relationship of inverted correspondence.  
Because the schema embodies both action and its nullification, it is the 
perfect metaphor of self-functioning for actors who wish to deny that 
they act on the world. 277  It also necessarily limits the amount of 
information under analysis.278  For these reasons, the bilateral conception 
of symmetry may be an even more problematic rhetorical and 
conceptual tool than the other senses of symmetry.  Indeed, as the 
discussions above indicate, most critiques of the normative use of this 
conception nevertheless rely on it.  This conception thus easily ends up 
driving and constraining analysis, leading it into circularity or indicating 
that a problem has been fully considered when its analysis has in fact 
only just begun.279 
To summarize, legal writers’ use of the concept of symmetry has 
moved from an almost exclusive focus on the holistic sense to a reliance 
on all three senses of the term.  The bilateral sense, perhaps embracing 
the other two, seems increasingly to predominate.  These developments 
have occurred alongside increasing conceptual fragmentation:  a 
movement to a state in which the term “symmetry” names several 
different ideas and is treated with continued ambivalence.  These 
changes have occurred against a backdrop of increasing difficulty in 
articulating the function of the legal system, a difficulty in itself partly a 
product of the proliferation of roles played by the system and the 
pressure on actors within the system to deny its activity and the 
contingency of their decision-making.  
                                                                                                                                  
this principle, and in Jacobs & Young v. Kent, decided the same year, he criticized the holistic 
sense of symmetry.  230 N.Y. 239, 242-43 (1921), quoted supra note 219.  But just three years 
later, in The Growth of the Law, he described justice as “consistent with symmetry and 
order.”  BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 89 (1924).  And in Palko v. 
Connecticut, he took as his reference point symmetry not only in the holistic sense but also 
in the relatively new sense of bilateral reflection.  302 U.S. at 328. 
277 See supra notes 24, 62-71 and accompanying text. 
278 See supra notes 24, 64-69 and accompanying text. 
279 See supra note 24. 
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B. Symmetry as a Symptom 
1. The Problem with Judicial Passivity  
The discussion above has sought to show that references to 
symmetry have consistently functioned as both a way to refer to what 
courts do and should be doing, and a way to indicate that they are 
actually doing nothing at all.  When judicial opinions use the concept of 
symmetry metaphorically, they most often use it as a placeholder for 
descriptions of judicial function.280  It refers to the work courts do:  
resolving conflict and imposing coherence through the perception or 
declaration of holistic symmetry; safeguarding regularity and 
impartiality through the identification of translational symmetries; and 
ensuring the full consideration of competing interests through the 
structuring of analysis on the model of bilateral reflection.  The 
compressed and familiar nature of all three of the symmetry schemas 
suits them well for use in summary references to the function of the 
judicial system.  They are generally used, however, not to explicate this 
function, but to demonstrate that it is so simple as to be almost 
nonexistent.  In this regard, the schemas simply reinforce the dominant 
articulation of the function of the law in our culture, which characterizes 
that function negatively rather than affirmatively.  This section briefly 
explores the reasons for this dominant articulation, touched on in the 
previous section in the context of references to symmetry, within a 
description of its wider scope and problematic implications. 
Descriptions of the judicial system as passive are ubiquitous in 
analyses of the nature of that system.281  We commonly note, for instance, 
that in an adversarial system, litigants define the contours of the 
controversies that the system resolves.  In such a system, judges and 
courts are understood as fundamentally passive.282  The Constitution 
ratifies this characterization, for the federal courts, through the 
                                                          
280 Even when courts use the concept to refer to judicial functions less directly—as in 
invocations of justified asymmetry or of the legislature’s intention to create a symmetrical 
statutory scheme—the perception of symmetry and the judgment regarding its normative 
value remain implicitly judicial tasks. 
281 The roots of this tradition extend beyond the founding of the United States, see Ellen 
E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L.J. 301 (1988-
89), but its ultimate origins lie outside the scope of the present study. 
282 See, e.g., MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY 
FOR BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY 137 (1986); Jonathan T. Molot, Principled Minimalism: Restriking 
the Balance Between Judicial Minimalism and Neutral Principles, 90 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1789-90 
(2004); Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1454, 
1481 (2000); Sward, supra note 281, at 312-13, 335-36 (1988-89). 
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jurisdictional restrictions of Article III.283  Characterizations of courts as 
lacking agency are also central to Alexander Hamilton’s characterization 
of the judicial system in the Federalist as the branch that “can take no 
active resolution whatever.”284  
Scholars have also long recognized the conventions through which 
judicial rhetoric itself dramatizes judicial action as passive and 
constrained, whether by conventions of precedential reasoning,285 the 
constitutional assignment of more active roles to the political branches,286 
or the need to enact social consensus.287  These conventional judicial 
stances are reinforced by a generally high scholarly view of judicial 
passivity.  Many current commentators describe both the negative 
definition of the judicial function288 and the extreme constraint, or even 
determination, of judicial action by social, economic, institutional, and 
political factors as not only inherent in the system, but also, perhaps, its 
defining feature.289  An important example of this tendency appears in 
the debate surrounding the notions of judicial activism and specifically 
in the evident difficulty of generating a solid response to that charge, 
even though many acknowledge the term “judicial activism” to be 
unsatisfactory and possibly even meaningless.290   
                                                          
283 U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see Molot, supra note 282, at 1762-63. 
284 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).  Structural 
characteristics are not the only constraints on the action of courts.  Jonathan T. Molot has 
noted the range of financial, social, reputational, and historical factors that constrain 
judicial action.  See Molot, supra note 282, at 1757-58, 1782-96; see also Dorf, supra note 87, at 
69-83. 
285 See also Molot, supra note 282, at 1758-59, 1801-03; Peters, supra note 282, at 1499-1513.  
See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 168.  Much of this commentary, deriving from Bickel’s 
work, focuses on the United States Supreme Court.  But the tradition of precedentialist 
constraint is applicable to other courts as well, including state courts.  Cf. Dorf, supra note 
87, at 32-33. 
286 See, e.g., BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 86, at 69, 183-98; Duncan 
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1751-60, 
1762-66 (1976); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365, 1413, 
1430-32 (1997); Peters, supra note 282, at 1455-76. 
287 Ferguson, supra note 2, at 208; see also BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra, 
at 86, 188, 204-07. 
288 See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 286, at 1736-37, 1742-43, 1751-62. 
289 See, e.g., BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 86, at 69-71, 111-98, 200; 
VERMEULE, supra note 167, at 86-181; Lessig, supra note 286, passim; Sward, supra note 281, at 
312-13, 335-36. 
290 On problems with the term “judicial activism,” see, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 
2019-20; Keenan D. Kmiec, The Origin and Current Meanings of “Judicial Activism,” 92 CAL. L. 
REV. 1441, 1442-44 (2004); and Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 
U. COLO. L. REV. 1139, 1141 (2002). 
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Although the tendency to follow judicial self-presentation by 
describing courts as desirably passive is widespread, it is not 
universal.291  Critiques of judicial passivity start from the same point as 
celebrations of that passivity:  the need to articulate the distinctiveness of 
the system in order to legitimate its actions.  These critiques note that it is 
difficult to legitimate an institution defined in primarily negative 
terms.292  Many such critiques focus on the vices of passivity in judicial 
rhetoric:  its inconsistency with the actual practice of courts in resolving 
real problems;293 the tendency it may have to promote a sense that 
judges, because their role is passive, are also unconstrained;294 and the 
obstacles it creates for clear communication with the political branches 
and other institutional actors.295  A few critiques have offered alternative, 
affirmative characterizations of the judicial role, but most limit these 
characterizations to particular features of the system—arguing that 
courts should, for instance, focus only on the protection of individual 
rights—instead of reconceptualizing the plural functions that the system 
actually serves.296  This is not an entirely satisfactory solution to the 
problem.  
The difficulty with articulating the distinctiveness of the judicial 
system, while doing full justice to its plural functions, directly underpins 
the controversies over judicial activism.297  Most often, that term 
describes either the assertion of decision-making autonomy by particular 
individual judges or the assertion of decision-making authority on behalf 
of the judicial system so as to override acts of other branches of 
government, which are understood as making the same types of policy 
decisions through other mechanisms.298  It is impossible to respond to 
                                                          
291 Alexander Bickel, despite his championing of the passive virtues, also criticized the 
rhetoric of passivity, identifying it with “mechanical jurisprudence.”  See BICKEL, THE 
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 86, at 71, 77-80, 91-93. 
292 See, e.g., Molot, supra note 282, at 1838-47; cf. Hugh Baxter, Autopoiesis and the “Relative 
Autonomy” of Law, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1987, 1989-92 (1998) (discussing difficulties of 
articulating “relative autonomy” of the legal system affirmatively). 
293 See Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, SUP. CT. REV., 2002, at 343, 
378-98, 407. 
294 See BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 86, at 92-93; Molot, supra note 
282, at 1835. 
295 See, e.g., BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 86, at 156, 179; Dorf, supra 
note 87, at 13-14, 60-69, 70-83. 
296 Commentators such as Ronald Dworkin, Michael Dorf, and Lawrence Lessig, for 
example, have argued that courts should be less hesitant about avowing their unique 
capacity for protecting individual rights.  See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 
81-130, 184-205 (1978); Dorf, supra note 87, at 69-83; Lessig, supra note 286, at 1414-32. 
297 See Young, supra note 290, passim. 
298 Cf. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 86, at 48, 70-71. 
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the confused equation of such different types of activity through 
reassertions of the inherent passivity of the judicial role.  A more 
effective response would discard the assumption that the function of the 
legal system must be understood as fundamentally passive and discard 
the rhetoric that reinforces this assumption.  To date, however, the 
function of the concept of symmetry in legal rhetoric and reasoning has 
been to strengthen this assumption, not to work against it.   
2. The Mere-Exposure Effect  
Every time a judicial opinion or scholarly analysis draws on the 
rhetoric of judicial passivity or, perhaps more potently, invokes a schema 
of symmetry to organize description or explanation or to justify a 
conclusion, the traditions and habits described in the previous section 
are reinforced.  With each unreflective use of the concept of symmetry, 
its power over us increases. 
Increased exposure to a symbol will increase our preference for that 
symbol, even if we attach no meaning to the symbol.  In the 1970s, 
Robert Zajonc conducted a series of experiments on what he termed the 
“mere-exposure effect.”299  In the experiments, Zajonc showed cards 
bearing Japanese ideographs to subjects who did not know Japanese.  
The subjects were shown some cards only a few times, others many more 
times.  Later the subjects were asked to indicate their preference for the 
cards, shown one at a time.  The subjects showed strong preferences for 
the ideographs they had seen many times, even though the characters 
held no meaning for the subjects.   
To be sure, the concept of symmetry is not devoid of meaning to the 
legal writers and commentators who rely on it.  But one purpose of this 
Article has been to show that when we assume that the significance of 
the concept is self-evident, expressing a simple and irreducible truth, we 
do divest the concept of much of its meaning and of many of its 
implications.  This impoverished understanding of the concept explains 
both its consistent use in the context of articulations of judicial passivity 
and the otherwise peculiar normative oscillations—from honorific to 
epithet and back again—evident in its usage for the past century or 
more. 
The mere-exposure effect suggests that over time this dynamic is 
likely to have become increasingly entrenched.  It may also have become 
                                                          
299 HUNT, supra note 37, at 505 (discussing Robert Zajonc, Feeling and Thinking: Preferences 
Need No Inferences, 35 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 151-75 (1980)). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 3 [2007], Art. 8
http://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss3/8
2007] The Rhetoric of Symmetry 1229 
increasingly invisible.  The dramatically increased reliance of scholarly 
commentary on the concept of symmetry provides some support for 
these propositions.300  Adding detail to our understanding of the 
concept, however, gives us the tools to remain aware of its implications 
as we use it, allowing us to begin to counteract these effects.301  This 
Article closes by sketching some preliminary suggestions for future use 
of each of the three conceptions of symmetry that have played such a 
prominent role in legal rhetoric. 
C. A Self-Conscious Rhetoric of Symmetry 
The three conceptions of symmetry described in this Article have 
tremendous heuristic value, but much of this value is squandered if the 
meanings of those conceptions are taken to be simple and self-evident.  
The holistic conception of symmetry, which powerfully expresses 
our drive toward coherence, has fit so well for so long into descriptions 
of the function of the legal system in part because one of the primary 
functions of that system has always been the resolution of conflict—
between individuals, between interests, and between tradition and 
change.  The problem with this conception, and the reason it is the 
conception most often criticized in legal discourse, is that it elides 
analysis.  It presents coherence as an achieved fact and does not 
acknowledge the effort and contingency inherent in its attainment.  
While this conception of symmetry may in some respects accurately 
reflect the way we reach conclusions,302 a conception of the judicial 
function that presents coherence as instantaneously achieved in every 
case is of little use to other individual and institutional participants in 
the legal system.303   
When tempted to refer to symmetry in the holistic sense, then, we 
should ask ourselves whether we have sufficiently examined and 
presented the grounds for our perception of a set of relationships as 
                                                          
300 See discussion supra Part III, especially supra note 89. 
301 On the effectiveness of debiasing, see Chen & Hanson, supra note 34, at 1228-38. 
302 For instance, much of our “backstage” mental operation is more holistic than we 
conventionally admit.  We tend to believe we know how things work without being able to 
articulate our knowledge in detail, relying heavily on holistic “illusions of explanatory 
depth” in making our decisions.  See WILSON, supra note 36, at 202-06 (describing how 
experimental subjects report confidence in their understanding of how particular processes 
work but are unable to articulate explanations when prompted). We also eliminate 
competing alternatives to our conclusions from consideration in the very process of 
reaching those conclusions.  See generally Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision 
Making, supra note 55. 
303 See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text. 
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harmonious.  Holistic symmetry should never be the sole reason 
provided in support of a conclusion.  Use of this sense of the term as a 
pejorative, as in Justice Stevens’s Haley dissent,304 is less pernicious, 
insofar as this use tends simply to express the insight that the perception 
of a conclusion as coherent, consistent, or balanced is always contingent 
on one’s frame of reference, and that such perceived coherence should 
therefore rarely be the sole justification for a result. 
The conception of symmetry as precise correspondence has been 
tenacious within legal discourse for analogous reasons:  it seems to 
describe both a central aspect of the way we reach conclusions and a 
central function of the legal system.  When we reason analytically, and 
especially when we must persuade others to accept the results of our 
reasoning processes, we most often do so using either categorical logic or 
analogy.305  Both processes depend on the exploitation of 
correspondences perceived as identity in some relevant regard.306  And 
we conceive of our legal system as engineered, at least in part, for a 
similar purpose:  the identical treatment of situations and individuals 
identical in relevant respects.307  Using the term “symmetry” in this 
sense, moreover, allows us to describe the actions of courts as both 
technically exact and minimally intrusive.  As uncertainty comes to play 
a larger role in our lives and our institutions, the certainty offered by 
regularity and expertise may be increasingly attractive.  Moreover, as 
material models of precise correspondence proliferate in our 
environment, we come to see these processes as more and more 
inevitable, without ever losing sight of their artifactual character.308   
Most of the references to justified asymmetry described in Part IV 
stem from the valid insight that, outside of the realm of artifacts and 
abstractions, truly precise correspondences of this type do not exist.  
Unfortunately, this insight too easily slides into the conclusion—
reminiscent of Westen’s critique of equality309—that the abstractions are 
not useful and should be discarded.  Actively self-aware use of the sense 
of symmetry as precise correspondence would, in contrast, remain 
conscious of the utility of the conception as an analytic device and of its 
status as a central aspiration of our legal system.  This awareness 
necessitates a conception of that legal system as a deliberate creation, a 
                                                          
304 Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 396 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
305 See supra notes 223-224 and accompanying text. 
306 See supra notes 223-224 and accompanying text. 
307 See VAN FRAASSEN, supra note 26, at 243. 
308 See supra notes 77-80, 300 and accompanying text. 
309 See supra Part II.B.1. 
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set of institutions that exist to generate solutions to problems people 
cannot solve on their own.  This understanding of the system in turn 
entails an acknowledgment of its participants as actively engaged in 
pursuit of a necessarily aspirational goal. 
Unthinking reliance on the bilateral reflective conception of 
symmetry may pose the greatest threat to effective reasoning and 
analysis.  This schema efficiently satisfies both our drive toward closure 
and our drive toward variety.310  It thus combines the strongest feature of 
the holistic conception of symmetry—its utility as a device for expressing 
coherence—and the strongest feature of the sense of symmetry as precise 
correspondence—its usefulness in structuring analysis and giving order 
to facts.  The frequency of this type of configuration in natural forms, in 
addition to our apparent predisposition to perceive this form of 
symmetry, ensures that reflective symmetry will almost always seem 
natural, even comforting, unlike the correspondence conception of 
symmetry.  Usage of conception in legal rhetoric confirms this 
supposition:  it is never the presence of bilateral symmetry, but only 
departure from it, that self-evidently requires explanation.  As the critics 
of the “asymmetric threat” term have pointed out, however, overreliance 
on the apparent givenness of this conception can be perilous.311  After all, 
our perception of a relationship of bilateral symmetry depends entirely 
on our frame of reference; what seems bilaterally symmetrical at one 
level of analysis will not seem symmetrical at another.312  Assuming that 
a perceived relationship of abstract bilateral symmetry or asymmetry 
tells the whole story with respect to a problem under analysis, and that 
we have completed analysis once we have identified the complementary 
components that, together, form the relationship we perceive, may 
therefore lead us to stop the analysis right where it should start.  
The bilateral symmetry schema is indeed a good starting point for 
analysis because it permits manageable analysis.  But because this 
schema inherently limits the amount of information under consideration, 
analysis should never end with identification of a relationship of 
bilateral symmetry or asymmetry.  When we are tempted to address a 
problem in this way, we should always ask ourselves several additional 
questions.  What shift in our conceptual frame of reference would cause 
the bilateral structure to disappear?  What are the reasons not to make 
that shift?  What simplifications might we be performing unconsciously 
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in order to make the problem fit this schema?  And what difference does 
it make to our analysis if the symmetry is conceptualized not in terms of 
vertical reflection, implying equivalence, but in terms of reflection 
around an axis other than the vertical, perhaps implying hierarchy? 
The 2000 opinion of the California Supreme Court in Armendariz313 
provides a useful model of this type of analysis.  The court in Armendariz 
noted, but rejected, the assumption that apparent bilateral asymmetry in 
contractual terms demands rectification in every case.314  It further noted 
that asymmetry depends on one’s frame of reference:  an agreement that 
seems asymmetrical to outside parties may not seem that way to the 
parties to the agreement.315  The court in Armendariz concluded, 
however, that where the asymmetry in question is really a matter of 
hierarchy rather than a simple lack of correspondence, as in the case of 
adhesion contracts, active decision-making and interference by courts 
should not be avoided or denied.316   
Unfortunately, the type of analysis conducted in Armendariz may be 
the exception rather than the rule; indeed, the opinion presents itself as 
such.  Much more common are approaches resembling that of Justice 
Scalia in his Velazquez dissent.317  In that opinion, Justice Scalia based his 
judgment of the constitutionality of a restriction on legal-services 
funding largely on his description of the restriction as adversarially 
symmetrical, and thus self-evidently acceptable.318  His description of the 
parties affected by the funding restriction as complementary but 
equivalent litigants permitted this characterization and simplified the 
scenario considerably.  Analysis in these terms makes no room for the 
possibility that from within another frame of reference, such as that of 
resource access, the respective positions of the parties involved in 
challenges to welfare laws might not be at all comparable.  From this 
perspective, the dividing line permitting description of the restriction as 
bilaterally symmetrical in its effects really marks a hierarchical social 
division,319 and active judicial rejection of legal structures that reproduce 
that social hierarchy in a way conflicting with the redistributive 
purposes of welfare laws—instead of advancing those purposes—seems 
far less inappropriate.  Summary references to symmetry as equivalent to 
                                                          
313 Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., 24 Cal. 4th 83 (Cal. 2000). 
314 Id. at 118. 
315 Id. 
316 Id. at 114-21. 
317 Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 549 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
318 Id. at 551. 
319 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
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self-evident fairness, such as Justice Scalia’s, preclude more thoroughly 
contextualized and precise analysis.  Such references not only entrench 
harmful conceptualizations of the judicial system as primarily passive, 
but also limit the problem-solving flexibility of the system. 
Because the concept of symmetry has for so long been used to 
describe such disparate functions of the legal system, this type of 
unreflective legal reliance on the concept may pose a threat.  Not only is 
the reliance close to invisible because of its ubiquity, but it subtly 
exacerbates the problems inherent in the rhetoric of passivity that 
pervades discussion within and about the judicial system.  This effect is 
unlikely to correct itself as it becomes more and more familiar to us.  This 
Article attempts to offer some of the information needed for more careful 
use of the various conceptions of symmetry.  Refusing to take the 
significance of these conceptions as self-evident may not only strengthen 
legal reasoning and description, but also contribute to clearer recognition 
of the legitimate decision-making activities that legal rhetoric performs 
and records. 
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